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As the security landscape changes, the importance of strong and influential 
partnerships for security cooperation (SC) increases. The process of selecting the best 
possible partners should not be neglected; tools to accomplish this task may already exist. 
Recently, the use of social network analysis (SNA) has allowed the military to map dark 
networks of terrorist organizations and selectively target key elements. SNA data 
collection and analysis efforts remain focused on these terrorist networks, whereas 
friendly or light networks have been relatively neglected.  
This thesis highlights the importance of analyzing light networks for SC and 
introduces the concept of dim networks. These are networks that consist of friendly actors 
whose connections to external organizations may not be public. This thesis has potential 
to improve partner security force engagement selection through the use of SNA 
principles, methods, and software, yielding several dividends. First, it provides a 
commander with a detailed understanding of the foreign units involved in SC, which 
allows for development of a more focused engagement strategy. Second, it allows SC 
planners to invest time and resources on the partner security forces that most effectively 
advance the commander’s engagement priorities. Third, it reinforces the collection of 
network-related data on organizations the U.S. military cooperates with and the 
importance of analyzing that empirical data to improve SC. 
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 1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
“Today we are faced with the preeminent fact that, if civilization is to 
survive, we must cultivate the science of human relationships—the ability 
of all peoples, of all kinds, to live together and work together, in the same 
world, at peace.”1 
—President Franklin D. Roosevelt  
 
The idea of “peacetime engagement” through security cooperation (SC) is 
reemerging as the predominant national policy of the United States because of the official 
ending of both the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.2 The end of Operation Enduring 
Freedom after 13 years of combat has slowly transitioned military activity across the 
globe to a perpetual war state in which irregular warfare places fresh demands on security 
cooperation. This transition requires network building to occur during overseas military 
engagements. We refer to peacetime engagement as the policy that includes a fusion of 
political, economic, and military means to achieve the ends of international partnership 
for peace, stability, conflict deterrence, and power projection for this thesis. Last, we will 
focus on U.S. Special Operations Forces (USSOF) as the means to execute this national 
policy, more specifically Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) and the forces 
assigned to that command.   
U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) defines the human domain as 
“The totality of the physical, cultural, and social environments that influence human 
behavior to the extent that success of any military operation or campaign depends on the 
application of unique capabilities that are designed to fight and win population centric 
conflicts.”3 The ability for USSOF to achieve success and shape environments is rooted 
                                                 
1 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Undelivered Address Prepared for Jefferson Day.” (April 13, 1945), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16602. 
2 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
Defense, 2014).  
3 U.S. Special Operations Forces, Operating Concept (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: United States 
Special Operations Command, 2013), 5.  
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in its ability to understand this complex and evolving domain. This area is one of the 
most critical aspects of global security because it is the defining factor in all conflicts. 
The following is a statement made in a recent white paper organized by top-level military 
leaders in the Marine Corps, Army, and Special Operations:  
Land operations have a uniquely significant role, in both peacetime and 
conflict, in addressing human factors. This assertion rises from the 
recognition that: 1) the Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations 
Forces significantly contribute to the activities central to influencing the 
“human domain” short of war, such as peacekeeping, comprehensive 
military engagement, security force assistance, building partner capacity, 
and stability operations; 2) in conflict, the same forces are those most 
intimately and closely involved with the human networks – friendly, 
enemy, and neutral—that comprise the “human domain”; and 3) strategic 
success or failure most often occurs within the land domain, especially in 
the shared space between humans and the land, and potentially in the 
shared space between humans and the cyberspace domain.4 
The combination of the different services contributing to this white paper signals that a 
gap exists in understanding the operating environment. It is important to note the 
emphasis placed on human networks, and that they comprise not only enemy elements 
but also those of friendly and neutral elements.   
The U.S. government uses combatant commands’ theater engagement plans to 
project power, build and strengthen alliances, and maintain influence in areas throughout 
the world. As part of the combatant command’s theater campaign plans, the Department 
of Defense (DOD) conducts military training to build up and strengthen the defensive 
capabilities of its allies. Often, during the execution of these exercises, USSOF partner 
with their equivalents in foreign countries (i.e., a Special Forces team will partner and 
train with the partner nation’s Special Forces unit). This can come with a cost when a 
lack of understanding exists of how that security force is networked or positioned within 
their country. In a time of crisis, it is unclear whether this unit will have the optimal 
political connectivity and resources at its disposal that are necessary to prevent threats 
from emerging or before they have the ability to inflict significant devastation.  
                                                 
4 Army Capabilities Integration Center, Strategic Landpower: Winning the Clash of Wills. May 6, 
2013. 
 3 
Introducing a new concept called “dim networks,” this thesis will use case study 
analysis to explore how the utilization of social network analysis may optimize partner 
security force selection. Key ideas of dark networks and light networks within SNA will 
be used. Dark networks will be defined as covert organizations that engage in illegal 
activities and have inflicted harm to others, whereas light networks are open and overt 
and do not set out to intentionally harm people.5 Within this spectrum of networks—and 
unique to this research—is the idea of focusing on the dim networks surrounding military 
engagements overseas. Dim networks are located in the middle of the dark-light network 
spectrum and can take on characteristics of either and are defined as a network that 
displays both overt and covert tendencies. A new dimension within this spectrum is a dim 
network. They tend to be informal, unpublicized relationships between entities yet can be 
open; however, information to illuminate these networks is missing. The goal is to 
transition a dim network to a light network or dark network. In Chapter III, dim networks 
and the dark-light network spectrum will be discussed and analyzed further.  
This thesis will include case studies that highlight examples of the effective use of 
SNA that provide elevated situational awareness and understandings of organizations. 
These insights allow for decisions to be made that shape the operational environment and 
therefore build a case supporting the use of this analysis in the SC planning process, 
focused specifically around engagement selection. Additionally, a proof of concept 
through the simulation of a SNA approach to a SC network in a notional country is 
provided to demonstrate the process and provide examples of the data required that 
would allow for detailed analysis. The simulation demonstrates the utility of SNA in 
engagement selection. This framework may help to provide tools to facilitate structured 
data collection that could lead to effective analysis.  
One of the methods to determine the “success” or results of SC events achieving 
national level objectives is through the lens of network theory. To determine which forces 
are selected, quantitative measures and assessments must be developed that capture the 
causal relationships between the military aid, skill sets, and resources obtained by the 
                                                 
5 Jörg Raab and H. Brinton Milward, “Dark Networks as Problems,” Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory, J-Part 13, no. 4 (2003): 413–439.  
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host nation. Understanding how forces use these capabilities within their own networks 
will impact how future bilateral and multilateral military engagements are conducted 
because the network aspect of engagements may determine the direction of an 
engagement strategy. However, focused collection efforts need to be prioritized in order 
to gather the necessary data to visualize these networks and close knowledge gaps about 
the operating environment.  
A. PROBLEM 
“Why are we training this unit? What are the long-term objectives we are trying to 
achieve by training this particular unit? What is the desired end-state for this unit? Why is 
this particular unit important?” These are common questions that USSOF teams ask 
before carrying out a security cooperation-training event, and all too often, these 
questions go unanswered before the execution of the training. Both authors of this 
research have similar experiences with this type of situation in SC events.  
Two anecdotes derived from personal experiences of each author illustrate 
discrepancies in SC events that relate to the research. In the winter of 2010, Captain 
Travis Taylor was in command of a Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha. His 
detachment was deployed to a Central Asian country with a mission to train a specific 
security force in counter narcotics and tactics. The Special Forces Operational 
Detachment Alpha coordinated with the Operational Planning Team, located at Special 
Operations Command Central, to ensure that their plan and program of instruction was 
nested with the Special Operations Command Central commander’s desired end state for 
the Partner Security Force (PSF) unit. Unfortunately, no such end state or guidance was 
available. In fact, there was no unit specific long-term plan at that time, which 
undermined the purpose of the training. Additionally, the host nation continued making 
last-minute changes, causing the engagement to be changed three separate times. This 
would become a familiar situation for many other teams charged with the mission to train 
the security forces in that country, whereby no two training events seemed connected; 
each was separate, without a clear purpose to advance any line of operation or line of 
effort of the Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) or the host nation.  
 5 
The second example shows similar experiences during a Civil-Military 
Engagement mission in Southeast Asia. Captain Antione Fernandes was in charge of 
developing a comprehensive “build partner capacity” program to develop civil military 
operations with a host-nation unit. Additionally, he was asked to coordinate and 
synchronize all SC events that took place in country. Each engagement had a similar 
theme: the lead planners did not know why they were engaging with a specific unit over 
other units, nor did they have any sense of how that unit progressed from the previous 
exercise. Captain Fernandes had only a mere recommendation that he could dictate to the 
unit being trained, the location where the engagement would take place, and/or the point 
of instruction, yet he could not base these recommendations on anything tangible other 
than his 2- to 3-month observations while in-country. Although he held substantial 
influence from his position, he could not objectively rationalize the exercises the planners 
intended to execute or even his recommendations to them to help “improve” their events.  
Conversations with other officers with similar experiences led to the belief that 
these circumstances are more common than not. According to reports obtained from the 
Joint United States Military Advisor Group-Philippines in fiscal year 2015, there were 
199 separate SC events scheduled for the Pacific Command (PACOM) area of 
responsibility. SOCPAC units carried out 68 of those 199 events.6 Despite a high number 
of individual events, many were not connected to each other. Those that were seem to 
only be connected to subsequent events that were conducted by similar unit. First Special 
Forces Group (Airborne) carried out the majority of the SOCPAC events. These units 
will typically work with the same units or a group of host nation units. Unfortunately, 
even under these circumstances, many of the events may not be connected nor are the 
units that are trained consistent with each event.   
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can SNA assist in identifying the most influential, military units to partner 
with when applied to partner security force networks? Furthermore, are the data required 
                                                 
6 Theodore T. Liebreich, “JCET Program Overview for PNP MG,”  (Joint United States Military 
Advisory Group reporting, Philippines, 2014). 
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to illuminate dim networks available and organized in such a way to allow planners to 
use SNA?    
C. CLAIM AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis proposes the utilization of SNA to examine the dim networks 
surrounding U.S. partner security forces. These networks are typically referred to as 
“light” or “bright” networks when illuminated. However, we believe they are more 
accurately described as “dim networks” because of the lack of collective information 
about them. For these networks to be fully understood and used, they must be illuminated 
or mapped. If the network is visualized, it can be more easily influenced. SNA is 
uniquely suited to provide the necessary process to do this.   
1. Overview  
If what we propose is true, then we should see evidence of these partner networks 
in the areas where USSOF operate as well as be able to identify if those networks had an 
impact on certain operations or events. The variable we will focus on is the “partnered 
force” or “partnered unit” with which USSOF engages. To study the application of SNA 
toward engagement selection, we selected case studies that describe in detail how SNA 
has been operationalized in the past to illuminate dark and dim networks. It is necessary 
to show how the principles and methods within SNA are effective regardless of the type 
of network, the purpose of illuminating that network, or how the actors or organizations 
in the network influenced their environment.   
Because SNA comprises many different social science disciplines, it is common 
for theories within this field to have the same definition but a different terminology. For 
example, the term “individuals” can also be referred to as “actors,” “nodes,” or 
“vertices.”7 Additionally, different social network analysts adopt different methods when 
conducting fieldwork. Although differences can be observed based on their backgrounds 
and level of expertise, the lessons can still be beneficial to incorporate within this 
research.   
                                                 
7 Christina Prell, Social Network Analysis: History, Theory & Methodology (London: SAGE 
Publications Ltd, 2011), 8.  
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The military has predominantly used SNA to disrupt or dismantle dark networks. 
It is necessary to describe how the application of SNA can support the Geographic 
Combatant Commands (GCC) Theater Campaign Plan and the TSOC’s Theater Security 
Cooperation Program (TSCP) through the use of historical case studies. Within each case 
study, the important attributes8 used will be examined to determine which strategy would 
be most effective in either influencing or combating the network. Additional benefits of 
this analysis can provide opportunities to adjust the types and purpose of engagements 
based on the dynamics of the network. The goal would be to shape the operational 
environment so that these “SOF networks” have the ability to successfully respond to 
threats. 
In Chapter IV, a case study will include an examination from two perspectives. 
This case study involves a crisis situation that occurred in the Philippines in 2013 that 
one of the authors witnessed firsthand. This crisis included agencies and officials from 
the national government, local government, key nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 
and the majority of the security force units in the country. The first portion will include a 
retrospective analysis to indicate focus areas required for this analysis. This case tests the 
network theory and determines what information is necessary to construct a beneficial 
organizational network picture or indicate ways to improve upon the presented method of 
analysis.  
Additionally, Chapter IV will describe what changes are needed to move forward 
with efforts to incorporate SNA into PSF selection by examining current USSOF SC 
reporting requirements. Each mission that USSOF executes requires the creation and 
filing of numerous reports. One such report includes a Special Operations Debrief and 
Retrieval System (SODARS). By examining this robust report, we can determine whether 
reporting is a priority and if current arrangements support conducting SNA on light 
networks. The authors will attempt to construct a network based on existing reporting to 
reconstruct the government of the Philippines’ response network during the Zamboanga 
City Crisis.  
                                                 
8 Sean F. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 14. Note: An 
attribute is defined as a characteristics of individual actors (e.g., race, gender, ethnicity). 
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Chapter V will include a simulated network that displays organizations and their 
relationships with each other as a proof of concept. This simulated network will use the 
concepts outlined in this thesis to provide a visualization of how SNA could illuminate 
dim networks to determine which organizations should be engaged. This determination 
will be based on simple SNA centrality measures, total degree,9 betweenness,10 
closeness,11 and Eigenvector.12  
2. Case Selection 
Of the two case studies highlighting existing SNA research, the focus will be on 
SNA as applied to the dark network of the Indonesian terrorist group Noordin Top.13 This 
case study will demonstrate the application of SNA on dark networks to understand and 
visualize key influential actors and target them for exploitation or elimination. This thesis 
seeks to expand the use of SNA beyond kinetic targeting and present the argument that 
the principles of this analysis can be applied to the “targeting” of PSF. This peacetime 
targeting is geared for the purposes of focusing the developmental effort on units that will 
best serve the security interests of not only their country, but also that of the United 
States. To do so, it is necessary to apply the SNA to a light network. Our second case 
involves the Humanitarian Assistance Network in Tajikistan,14 which will provide 
insights into how dim networks can become light.  
                                                 
9 Total degree centrality is the number of a node’s ties. 
10 Betweenness centrality measures the range to which each node lies on the shortest path between all 
other nodes in a network.   
11 Closeness centrality measures how close each node is to all the other nodes in a network by their 
path distance.  
12 Eigenvector centrality assumes that ties to central nodes are more important than ties to exterior 
nodes and therefore weighs the nodes’ connections to others by their centrality scores.  
13 This network was mapped using data drawn originally from Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin’s 
Networks, a publication of the International Crisis Group. Military students at the Naval Postgraduate 
School participating in a class entitled, Tracking and Disrupting Dark Networks initially coded the data. 
This class was a part of a Common Operational Research Environment (CORE) Lab sub-curriculum 
instructed by Professor Sean Everton, Co-Director of the CORE Lab. 
14 Jeffery S. Han and Ryan Schloesser, “Joining the Helping Hands: Understanding the Humanitarian 
Assistance Network in Tajikistan” (Unpublished paper, Naval Postgraduate School, March 27, 2014). 
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We selected our cases based on the following conditions: (1) the case analysis and 
research originated from and was completed by a military-related source; (2) the 
individuals or organizations in each case are located in an country where USSOF 
conducts SC events; (3) the case takes a previously unmapped network whether dark 
(covert) or light (overt) and maps them; and (4) the results of each case were derived and 
presented through the primary use of SNA.  
Both of the cases in Chapter IV contain examples of networks developed through 
the use of SNA tools and methodology. Each network is understood to have existed 
before the analysis; however, no visual representation of the networks existed. The visual 
representation through tools from this analysis is paramount to the dissection and 
examination of each network and their nodes or parts. Although both cases exist in 
different environments and reflect different circumstances, their similarities allow us to 
determine how this analysis was effective in providing necessary information to allow for 
improved decision-making. This information is also representative of a detailed 
understanding of how networks affect the operational environment in which they exist.   
3. Data Sources and Procedures  
Currently, there is limited research that attempts to integrate SNA to analyze 
effects of SC events; therefore, many different sources were used throughout the course 
of this research. After-action reports from SOCPAC and the host nation were used to 
study how both sides viewed SC. At a deeper level, the USSOF reports were used to 
determine if the information needed to understand friendly networks was collected by 
operators and prioritized by higher commands. The next phase included taking these 
reports and inputting them into SNA programs to visualize any networks that emerged. 
To supplement missing information, open news sources were used by reputable news 
agencies within the United States and the Philippines. Additionally, for this approach to 
be effectively implemented across different theaters, a simulated network was created. 
This network includes a step-by-step process describing the information necessary to 
collect, and how to use SNA metrics such as centrality, to understand networks.  
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4. Assumptions 
The following assumptions substantially guided the research conducted:  
Assumption One: There are enough accessible data from the theory development 
case that contain the information needed to extract the relational data required to 
map out the networks without conducting interviews. 
Assumption Two: The simulated data will allow for this model to be used in other 
environments to measure friendly networks appropriately.  
Assumption Three: The SNA measures will reveal network characteristics of the 
PSF, including relationships with outside organizations that will enable decision 
makers to adjust future engagement strategies.  
D. FRAMING THE SITUATION 
Numerous National Capital Region policy documents impact how the DOD 
trains, equips, and fights. The National Security Strategy (NSS) published in February 
2015 presents a common theme of “global complexity.” The NSS also expressed the need 
to ensure that the United States maintains its global partnerships and continues to build 
partner capacity in order to prevent conflict, to secure international order, and to 
strengthen our national defense.15 Additionally, throughout the document, President 
Obama reemphasized the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region. This is echoed in the 
Defense Strategic Guidance of 2012, which specifically states, “We will also expand our 
networks of cooperation with emerging partners throughout the Asia-Pacific to ensure 
collective capability and capacity for securing common interests.”16 In the 2014 
Quadrennial Defense Review, then-Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel, eloquently 
described his vision for the future of U.S. defense strategy:   
Our sustained attention and engagement will be important in shaping 
emerging global trends, both positive and negative. Unprecedented levels 
of global connectedness provide common incentives for international 
                                                 
15 Barack Obama, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: The 
White House, 2015). www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf. 
16 Department of Defense, Defense Strategic Guidance (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
Defense, 2012) http://archive.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf. 
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cooperation and shared norms of behavior, and the growing capacity of 
some regional partners provides an opportunity for countries to play great 
and even leading roles in advancing mutual security interests in their 
respective regions. In addressing the changing strategic environment, the 
United States will rely on our many comparative advantages, including the 
strength of our economy, our strong network of alliances and partnerships, 
and our military’s human capital and technological edge.17 
Hagel emphasizes many key themes surrounding partnership and engagement, 
capacity of our allies, and networks within his vision. Although the United States has 
always relied on treaties and allies for international cooperation, the anticipated changes 
within the global environment call for a substantial increase in global partnerships. Hagel 
goes on to describe the DOD’s role in this strategy: 
The role of the Department of Defense in supporting U.S. interests is 
rooted in our efforts to reduce the potential for conflict, by deterring 
aggression and coercive behavior in key regions, and by positively 
influencing global events through our proactive engagement.18 
Once again, the predominant theme is about global complexity and the priority placed on 
maintaining our engagement strategy as a means to shape the global security environment 
and ensure U.S. national security. In this case, the term “proactive engagement” is 
extremely important in times of the diminishing manpower, budgets, and additional 
resources needed to project global power. Engagement strategies will need to be renewed 
and focused to meet the demands established in the Quadrennial Defense Review.  
The 2015 National Military Strategy, echoes the NSS with a continued call for the 
“military to remain globally engaged to shape the security environment and to preserve 
our network of alliances.” Networks are once again used to formulate the thinking behind 
this strategy. Outlined in the NSS, the national military objectives provide succinct end 
states for our military: “Deter, deny, and defeat state adversaries; disrupt, degrade, and 
defeat violent extremist organizations; and strengthen our global network of allies and” 
                                                 
17 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
Defense, 2014) http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf.  
18 Ibid. 
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partners.19 Each set of objectives is critical to the rebalance to Asia. The NSS emphasizes 
the importance of the presence of U.S. Forces in key locations to meet these objectives as 
well as to provide necessary early warning and response to impending crises. The 
question remains: How exactly will the small footprint of U.S. Forces strategically 
positioned globally be able to tap into the “networks of allies and partners” in a time of 
crisis? 
Retired Navy Admiral William McRaven, former commander of USSOCOM, 
outlined clear strategic ends for USSOCOM in the 2013 USSOCOM USSOF Operating 
Concept. Building on the Defense Strategic Guidance, McRaven articulated his vision for 
the future of USSOF operations in the twenty-first century within each preceding 
document for defense strategy. McRaven highlighted USSOF’s role in enduring global 
engagements through long-term, scaled, and distributed operations. In doing so, he 
stressed that USSOF will be positioned to enable, create, and maintain partnerships that 
endure, prevent conflicts, and prepare to fight and win our nations wars.20 SOCOM is 
forming ways to meet the requirements that establish the global networks outlined in the 
National Capital Region documents. McRaven has created a requirement for USSOF to 
spearhead and maintain these networks, essentially becoming the force of choice to shape 
future USSOF engagements that focus on building the global networks worldwide.  
Moving downward to the theater level, SOCPAC’s lines of effort are additionally 
nested with the guidance provided by higher echelons, including those of USSOCOM. 
SOCPAC’s lines of effort address understanding theater strategy and move toward 
accomplishing strategic objectives. Those lines of effort are as follows.  
1. Gain visibility and understanding of the environment.  
2. Prepare for the environment.   
3. Shape the operational environment.   
4. Build partner capacity.   
5. Attack the threat.21  
                                                 
19 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2015. The United 
States Military’s Contribution To National Security” (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015)  
http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf.  
20 U.S. Special Operations Command, Operating Concept (MacDill Air Force Base, FL, 2013), 3,  
21 Data for this study originate from unclassified portions of the Special Operations Command Pacific 
that are available from the special operations command Pacific (SOCAC) portal.  
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It is apparent that, within our defense structure, the importance of building and 
maintaining networks and alliances of partners that share the same norms of security and 
international order is recognized as a priority. Although there is a network theme from 
the national region to the tactical level, very little is known or understood about these 
networks. This creates opportunities to accomplish the other lines of effort identified 
previously by correcting this void. By leveraging the networks of partners, SOCPAC will 
be positioned to develop a better understanding of the environment and thus be able to 
conduct more effective preparation and shaping operations. By building the capacity of 
partner forces, SOCPAC is investing within these global networks to increase its ability 
to deal with future threats unilaterally. However, the argument is not “if” we should 
engage or build partner capacity, nor is it particularly “when” we should do it; the 
question is “with whom” we should engage. Furthermore, in an era of long-term fiscal 
austerity and force reductions, USSOF remains the preeminent solution for sustained, 
low-cost, low-signature, persistent engagement.   
As the DOD continues to downsize to a postwar structure, cost-effective measures 
must be implemented to optimize military activities worldwide. Fiscal austerity has 
become the new “norm,” and USSOF specifically has to evolve from a force that 
previously had a bottomless budget to a force that must do more with less. A region 
where this mindset has overshadowed the primacy of expensive direct action is the Asian 
Pacific.  
E. ASIA-PACIFIC PIVOT 
Due in part to the perceived expansion of Chinese influence, President Obama 
announced a “pivot” or “rebalance” to Asia in 2012. In a 2011 op-ed for Foreign Policy 
Magazine, “America’s Pacific Century,” Hillary Clinton, then-Secretary of State, 
addressed the importance of reinvesting in the Pacific saying, “The future of politics will 
be decided in Asia, not Afghanistan or Iraq, and the United States will be right at the 
center of the action.” Additionally, she wrote, “In the last decade, our foreign policy has 
transitioned from dealing with the post-Cold War peace dividend to demanding 
commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. As those wars wind down, we will need to 
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accelerate efforts to pivot to new global realities.”22 More recently, the Asian-Pacific 
region pivot has reemerged as a focal point for U.S. national security by President 
Obama’s push for the Trans-Pacific Partnership23 and his guidance to rebalance or pivot 
to Asia.24  
This effort to reinvest in the Pacific, specifically with regards to regional security 
and stability, would call upon USSOF to spearhead this campaign of engaging with 
strategic and influential PSF throughout the Pacific as identified in the 2013 USSOF 
Operating Concept. SOCPAC has operational control of all special operations conducted 
in the region. They have and will continue to be very active in this region by maintaining 
a near-permanent presence that conducts numerous SC operations in a total of nineteen 
countries.25 Strengthening the security environment and the military forces of U.S. 
partners in this region has become a top priority for the current administration and the 
DOD. In addition to persistent instability in the Middle East, Russia’s recent activity in 
Ukraine and China’s activity in the South China Sea are part of their attempts to become 
the superpower in those regions: a challenge and threat to U.S. hegemony. Such actions 
have significantly influenced U.S. foreign policy priorities and initiatives.   
F. U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS ROLE IN SECURITY COOPERATION 
Partnership, peace, stability, and success are all at stake in the complex and 
persistent struggle for regional and global security. USSOC is charged with shaping these 
ambiguous and constantly evolving environments in a way that is more conducive to 
advancing U.S. national security interests. USSOF are well suited to operate on this 
strategic stage, but must continue to adapt to emerging trends that will impact their 
                                                 
22 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011.   
23 The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is an economic trade agreement among twelve Pacific Rim 
countries. The agreement was reached on October 5, 2015, after 5 years of negotiations. According to the 
Office of United States Trade Representative Office’s website, the “TPP is a platform for engagement and 
growth in the Asia Pacific Region. It solidifies relationships with our allies and firmly establishes the 
United States as a leader in the Pacific.” More information can be found at their website, 
https://ustr.gov/tpp/.  
24 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, 
DC: The White House, 2015). 
25 Data for this study originate from unclassified portions of the Special Operations Command Pacific 
that are available from the special operations command Pacific (SOCAC) portal.  
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operational capabilities and present challenges. The redistribution and diffusion of global 
power, the rising role of non-state actors, the increase in accessibility of advanced 
technology, rapid growth and expansion of urban spaces, and the continued fragility of 
the economic health of the United States and its partners will all influence the conditions 
around which USSOF will have to plan, provide resources, and execute operations.26 In 
his statement about the situation to the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee 
of Emerging Threats and Capabilities, General Votel explained “The diffusion of power 
is decreasing the ability of any state, acting alone, to control outcomes unilaterally. 
Globalization has created networked challenges on a massive scale. Only by working 
with a variety of security partners can we begin to address these issues.”27 
The majority of USSOF operations will encompass the full spectrum of SC 
through peacetime engagement. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s Security 
Assistance Management Manual provides the definition and purpose SC as follows. 
All activities undertaken by the Department of Defense (DOD) to 
encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States 
to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DOD interactions with 
foreign defense and security establishments, including all DOD-
administered Security Assistance (SA) programs, that build defense and 
security relationships; promote specific U.S. security interests, including 
all international armaments cooperation activities and SA activities; 
develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and 
multinational operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and 
contingency access to host nations. It is DOD policy that SC is an 
important tool of national security and foreign policy and is an integral 
element of the DOD mission. SC activities shall be planned, programmed, 
budgeted, and executed with the same high degree of attention and 
efficiency as other integral DOD activities. SC requirements shall be 
combined with other DOD requirements and implemented through 
standard DOD systems, facilities, and procedures.28  
                                                 
26 Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, 4th 
edition (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, 2015), 1–3. 
27 General Joseph L. Votel, Statement to The House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on 
Emerging Threats and Capabilities, March 18, 2015.  http://fas.org/irp/congress/2015_hr/031815votel.pdf.  
28 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Security Assistance Management Manual, C1.1.1 
(Washington, DC: Defense Security Cooperation Agency). 
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Each engagement has the potential to have positive and negative strategic impacts. The 
possibility of negative impacts is critical, with many different variables that must be 
accounted for in order to mitigate them.  
The origins and evolution of the current TSCP for the USSOCOM began long 
before the organization was established. After World War II, the U.S. military was used 
in various fashions to promote democracy and assist many war-torn nations to rebuild not 
only their fighting forces, but also their diplomatic capabilities.29 The creation of the 
modern U.S. Special Forces in 1952 was largely brought about from the need to have 
U.S. elements positioned in specific former Soviet countries to train and equip guerrilla 
forces to combat the possible Soviet threat to Western Europe. The training of foreign 
militaries in unconventional warfare by these forces became the cornerstone of U.S. 
special operations.30  
Today, USSOF continue this legacy through military engagements in more than 
eighty countries.31 These engagements range from Joint Combined Exchange Training 
(JCET), which permits USSOF to train through interaction with friendly foreign forces,32 
to civil-military subject matter expert exchanges that focus on sharing knowledge 
between a foreign military and the U.S. military. These exchanges represent a complete 
joint effort, with all four branches conducting similar engagements across the globe. All 
are central to USSOCOM’s establishment of a global network of partners, and each 
engagement serves to further expand this network that in essence could serve as future 
conduits of information, intelligence, alliance, and support.33 Furthermore, TSCP 
engagements are an extension of U.S. foreign policy; they act as physical manifestations 
of U.S. resolve in combating international and transnational threats globally.   
                                                 
29 Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944–1946 (U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1975), iii. 
30 Special Forces Association, “The Origin of Special Forces.” 
31 Votel, Statement to The House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and 
Capabilities. 
32 Joint Report to Congress, Foreign Military Training, Volume 1, Fiscal Years 2008 and 2009. 
33 Thomas S. Szayna and William Welser IV, Developing and Assessing Options for the Global SOF 
Network (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2011), 1.  
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SOCPAC is a subunified command under PACOM located at Camp Smith, 
Hawaii, that “coordinates, plans, and directs special operations and related activities in 
the Pacific Theater.”34 SOCPAC’s mission supports the PACOM commander’s 
objectives in the region through the deterrence of aggression, providing forces to respond 
to emerging crisis, and advancing SC with PACOM partners through peacetime 
engagements. SOCPAC’s strategy uses an indirect approach that focuses on three specific 
lines of operation to meet PACOM objectives: “(1) increasing partner nation security 
capacity, (2) improving information gathering and sharing, and (3) securing the support 
of the population.”35 The pursuit of these objectives as part of the overall strategy of SC 
requires an adaptive and agile force that understands the networks that exist wherever the 
force operates.     
This thesis highlights the importance of networks and their role in engagement 
selection within SC.36 More specifically, this thesis will explore how SNA can assist in 
the determination of which entities the U.S. military should engage through the 
illumination of dim networks that could be instrumental in improving U.S. engagement 
capabilities. The lessons learned from studying terrorist organizations through SNA could 
be directly applied to the study of the PSF networks to uncover a greater awareness about 
potential allies, their capabilities, and the reach and depth of their influence. These 
networks can assist SC planners in understanding the potential influence each available 
unit has within a particular region and therefore provide them with necessary insight on 
how to best leverage that influence through selective engagement for the purposes of 




                                                 
34 JSOU, Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, 2–19. 
35 Ibid.  
36 We refer to the process of determining which PSF unit USSOF will partner, train, or work with as 
engagement selection. An engagement is any event that falls under the Building Partner Capacity 
Programs. This list can be found in the DSCA Security Assistance Management Manual, C15.1.4. 
http://www.samm.dsca.mil/chapter/chapter-15. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND BACKGROUND 
Chapter I described the major transition of the DOD from a wartime military back 
to a peacetime military, and emphasized the significance of the directed rebalance to 
Asia. This change is occurring even as contests throughout the world continue to 
challenge peace and stability. Chapter I also highlighted the importance of understanding 
and engaging human networks and ways in which the USSOF can be prepared to operate 
in the complex human domain. This chapter reviews the literature on networks, social 
networks, and the methodology of SNA. Additionally, this review will highlight the 
military focus on dark networks overpowering concepts related to network theory. This 
focus has resulted in the absence of developing and implementing extensive 
methodologies to illuminate dim PSF networks.   
A. NETWORKS  
“Networks are seen as an ideal arrangement to preserve organizational 
independence and flexibility while offering multiple organizations the 
possibility of reaching common goals in limited areas such as research 
and development or enhancing delivery of certain goods and service.”37 
—Jörg Raab and H. Brinton Milward 
 
The terms “networks” and” networking” have gained increasing popularity in the 
past 15 years. Both terms are often used interchangeably, albeit incorrectly, it is 
important to understand how they differ. Networking relies on the use of networks or, “a 
set of relations between objects which could be people, organizations, nations”38 to 
understand the number or type of existing relationships and/or attempts to establish 
beneficial connections within the networks itself. “Networks are based on trust, 
reciprocity, and shared experience”39 to achieve any sizable benefit from an established 
                                                 
37 Raab and Milward, “Dark Networks as Problems,” 418.  
38 Charles Kadushin, Understanding Social Networks: Theories, Concepts, and Findings (Oxford, 
U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2012.  
39 Raab and Milward, “Dark Networks as Problems,” 426.  
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network, users must understand the interplay surrounding the network (e.g., who has 
important relationships or how that network is connected or just as important, how it is 
not connected within their environment). 
Scholars have written about the importance of understanding networks in the 
periods of increased nonstate actor violence toward states. In his 2009 article, “How to 
Win,” John Arquilla discussed the importance of understanding network dynamics from a 
state perspective, explaining that, “if nations are to have any hope of ultimately defeating 
terrorism, they must understand networks as a distinct organizational form, not just a 
handy labeling device.”40 During the time Arquilla’s article was published, a paradigm 
shift was giving rise to the development of methods to examine covert networks (i.e., 
terrorist organizations). Yet the focus on network analysis remained fixated on 
developing methods to understand the networks surrounding threats against American 
security interests and not of U.S. allies.    
According to Albert-László Barabási, “Networks exist for a reason. They spread 
ideas; they spread knowledge; they spread influence”;41 to understand this allows for a 
greater realization of how and why particular events are caused by specific actors in 
various social situations. A thorough understanding of a network can lead to the 
development of a comprehensive approach to select ideal partner networks based entirely 
upon the type and amount of connections. Analysts and/or practitioners may essentially 
increase their ability to leverage, disrupt, or destroy networks by simply understanding 
how networks function and how they are structured as a method to uncover correlations 
that could help predict future behavior.  
Networks exist everywhere. Barabási provides examples of networks dating back 
to early Christianity and also to modern times with the use of the Internet and terrorism. 
Each example that Barabási uses includes actors that in some way share a connection 
                                                 
40 John Arquilla, “How to Win,” Foreign Policy, October 12, 2009. 
41 Albert-László Barabási, Introduction and Keynote to a Networked Self, ed. Zizi Papacharissi (New 
York, NY: Routledge, 2011), 12.  
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with others.42 The understanding of networks is increasingly important as network 
development begins to shape how our world conducts business and fights wars.  
B. SOCIAL NETWORKS 
Network theory provides extensive insights into the reasons why particular people 
are connected to one another. Networks and networking exist in a variety of forms from 
computer networks and satellite networks to unions and organized crime. All of these 
appear to have one characteristic in common: human social interaction at some level. 
Connections exist at a human level even with the utilization of technology. People 
interact with each other and create social networks. This section will focus on how items 
or information are transferred and/or distributed to different individuals throughout social 
networks. The idea behind social networks is significant to this research because PSFs 
that are engaged during SC events are truly members of social networks. Understanding 
these particular social networks is what this research aims to do.  
John Barnes, credited with coining the term “social network” in his 1954 study 
“Class and Committees in a Norwegian Island Parish,” explains that members of society 
interact with each other in a regular and organized fashion. Furthermore, this interaction 
occurs within the same sphere of discourse and is influenced by different aspects of that 
society, such as class. Barnes defined the social network in the Norwegian Island Parish 
as “a system of ties between pairs of persons who regard each other as approximate social 
equals.” Christina Prell defines a social network as “a set of relations that apply to a set of 
actors, as well as any additional information on those actors and relations.”43 These 
definitions begin to build on network theory by focusing on networks that are influenced 
by the human element as opposed studying inanimate objects that share connections. The 
study of social networks has led to the “small-world phenomenon,” or “six degrees of 
separation” idea, that two humans are connected through an average of five to six steps. 
Stanley Milgram pioneered this idea in his 1967 article, “The Small-World Problem.” 
                                                 
42 Albert-László Barabási, Linked: How Everything Is Connected to Everything Else and What it 
Means for Business, Science, and Everyday Life (New York, NY: Plume, 2009), 3–7.   
43 Prell, Social Network Analysis: History, Theory & Methodology, 9.  
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More recent studies have identified these characteristics to be prevalent in networks 
originating from nature as well as technology.44 In other words, social networks have 
similar characteristics across different types of networks.  
Different types of social networks exist around us. When we analyze a complex 
society, we begin to see examples of how different types of connections within these 
different social networks affect the transfer of information or ideas. Friendly networks 
often maintain a wide assortment of relational ties. Understanding how these ties affect 
social networks is important. Two prominent types of ties identified and introduced by 
Mark Granovetter are strong ties and weak ties.45 In considering the differences between 
both categories of ties, analysts acquire a broader sense of how people interact with one 
another and can extrapolate different natures of patterns.  
These different ties have increasingly come to light with the advent of social 
media and the ability for people to maintain connections they would not normally 
maintain if not for the ability to communicate instantaneously through technology. Most 
people maintain close relationships with certain people, such as immediate family and 
close personal friends. These kinds of ties typically help shape certain beliefs and 
personal characteristics and are characterized as strong ties. The ties we maintain with 
those outside this intimate circle are those that help us address everyday issues; these are 
labeled as weak ties. Granovetter’s research on the concept of weak ties argues that 
focusing on the micro-level or small-circle strong ties does not allow for connections to 
be made to the macro-level patterns. The weak ties act as bridges to facilitate diffusion 
within a network, allowing for micro-level interaction to feed into macro-level patterns 
and back to the small group.46 The idea of “strength of weak ties” is directly applicable to 
certain military use of network analysis. The need to understand the dynamics of social 
                                                 
44 Reka Albert, Hawoong Jeong, and Albert-Laszlo Barabasi, “Internet: The Diameter of the World 
Wide Web.” Nature 401, (1999), 103; Henry Kautz, Bart Selman, and Mehul Shah, “Referral Web: 
Combining Social Networks and Collaborative Filtering,” Communications of the ACM, 40 (March 1997), 
3. 
45 Mark Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973), 1360. 
46 Ibid. 
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networks for the specific intentions of influencing a network, predominantly a hostile 
network, has led the military to use SNA.   
SNA within the military construct has focused on dark networks. There appears to 
be a lack of focus on light networks and their importance to military operations and 
objectives; therefore, the new concept of dim networks will show the importance of 
studying light networks while also demonstrating shared characteristics with dark 
networks. Light networks are overt, open, and nonthreatening, but they are also public, 
and their connections are to some extent publicized. Connections may be more personal, 
more informal, and possibly of a more sensitive nature, whereas dim networks, although 
also nonthreatening, are not necessarily so public. This is a characteristic that dim 
networks share with dark networks. Dim networks exist in in between the dark-light 
network spectrum. Characteristics from both dark and light networks can be applied to a 
methodology focused on dim networks.  
C. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS  
In his book, Disrupting Dark Networks, Dr. Sean F. Everton defines SNA as “a 
collection of theories and methods that assume that behavior of actors is profoundly 
affected by their ties to others and the networks in which they are embedded.”47 This 
section will focus on three areas relevant to SNA, namely: (1) how SNA is used across 
different domains to include social science and the business world, (2) major concepts 
within the field to include common SNA metrics, and (3) the concept of nodes, including 
types and corresponding roles, and the importance of sociograms. We will also look at 
the military application of SNA, including different scholarly approaches and current 
military execution and doctrine. Presently, SNA focus within the military has been 
exclusively on dark networks, which was extremely important during the wartime focus 
in combat operations. However, by failing to focus on friendly networks diminished 
efforts to achieve any long-term progress in the Middle East has become apparent. This 
research will attempt to illustrate that by transforming the dim networks of the U.S. PSF 
                                                 
47 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 2.  
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to light networks can theoretically increase the success of U.S. long-term achievements in 
various types of operating environments. 
1. Origins of SNA in Social Science and Business  
SNA has been used in several disciplines to study group interactions and 
behaviors. Theories have originated within the social sciences and have then been 
implemented in the business world. Bernice Pescosolido’s 2007 article, “The Sociology 
of Social Networks,” describes the evolution of the use of SNA within social sciences. 
Pescosolido’s evolution describes the origins of social networks and how they implicitly 
signaled the existence of social ties to more current social network theories being used to 
show causation of events. A strength or limitation of current network theories within 
social science is that each maintains slightly different theories.48 An example of how 
business is using SNA can be seen in the book by Robert Cross and Robert Thomas, 
Driving Results through Social Networks: How Top Organizations Leverage Networks 
for Performance and Growth, which describes in detail how executives and managers can 
obtain significant performance and innovation advantages by leveraging networks.
49
 The 
business world has begun to see the utility of SNA as a tool within their domain to 
maintain competitive advantages and relevance.50 Both fields share commonalities that 
can be analyzed to determine best practices, which helps us understand how and why 
engagements are selected.  
2. SNA Building Block Concepts  
The recent integration of the different approaches within SNA helped pave the 
way for the formation of a modern approach. Though applications of SNA vary, they are 
generally characterized by: structural institution based on ties, systematic empirical data, 
                                                 
48 Bernice Pescosolido, “The Sociology of Social Networks,” in 21st Century Sociology, ed. C. Bryant 
and D. Peck (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc, 2007), pp. I-208-I-218. 
49 Cross, R. and Thomas, R. Driving Results Through Social Networks: How Top Organizations 
Leverage Networks for Performance and Growth (New York, NY: Jossey-Bass, 2009).  
50 Pescosolido, “The Sociology of Social Networks.” 
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pulls on graphic imagery, and heavy use of mathematical models within the theory.51 
Appropriate data can be used to construct mathematical-based graphs. These graphs 
display important and often concealed interpretations of that organization. This is one 
way to become familiar with the networks that the U.S. military creates, or the networks 
that already exist within the global special operations network.  
a. Nodes 
Actors or “nodes” within a network can considerably affect how the network 
functions. Karen Stephenson identifies examples of network nodes that have influential 
power and can significantly alter network dynamics, such as hubs, pulsetakers, and 
gatekeepers.52 According to Stephenson, each type of node has the ability to shape 
specific outcomes when this information is made available and is strategically used by 
organizational leaders. Although each type will be expressed as individuals, they can also 
take on organizational appearances as well. A crisis situation will be used here as it 
relates to the theory development case presented in a later chapter.  
The first characteristic type is a “hub,” or the “kind of person who becomes a 
gathering and sharing point for critical information.”53 Hubs will have many connections 
in the network that allow them to channel information and resources around the network 
with ease. During a crisis, hubs can be difficult to spot in the midst of chaos. There are 
usually several separate operations centers used by the police, military, the local 
government, the national government, and developmental agencies involved during a 
crisis. If and when these agencies ultimately come together, it is done in an ad hoc 
manner with minimal understanding of how the multitude of agencies can effectively 
collaborate toward a common goal. When placed in the correct position, hubs can act as 
connectors to these organizations and filter information more efficiently throughout the 
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larger network. Information about military units that display hub-like tendencies within 
their environments is essential when planning or conducting SC events.  
Stephenson’s second type of node features pulsetakers who “carefully cultivate 
relationships that allow them to monitor the ongoing health and direction of the 
organization.”54 This type of actors are extremely beneficial to have in the correct 
position during a time of crisis as they measure what is going on and help craft 
appropriate responses. A pulsetaker has the ability to act as a useful liaison with external 
organizations to increase coordination and collaboration efforts. This person can also 
make the needed organizational changes during time-sensitive situations in crisis when 
often-decentralized organizations emerge. This individual type is fundamental to 
increasing network ties through meaningful connections from either internal or external 
ties or a combination of the both.  
The third and final types are gatekeepers, who are the “information bottlenecks, 
controlling the flow of contact to a particular part of the organization, thus making 
themselves indispensable.”55 Knowing who gatekeepers are during a crisis would allow 
leadership to effectively disseminate pertinent information or resources for rapid 
decision-making purposes. Gatekeepers can shape decisions using their ability to pass 
certain fragments of information through a network. In Managing with Power, Jeffrey 
Pfeffer illustrates that a person in a gatekeeper position can alter the decision process of a 
company depending on the bias of the individual and how they decide to channel 
information.56 If left unchecked, a gatekeeper possesses great influential power within a 
network—power that can be used undesirably. This type of node can be instrumental to 
have in a joint operations center coordinating efforts or in close proximity to leadership. 
The wrong time to find out an individual has gatekeeper tendencies is after the crisis is 
over or after the information value has decreased. Having access to the right host nation 
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contact that can make important decisions before, during, and after SC events is a 
necessary step to achieving long-term success.  
b. SNA Metrics  
Networks take on different functions depending on their makeup, so it is vital to 
know and understand common SNA metrics such as size, density, degree of connection, 
centrality, closeness, betweenness, and clusters.57 These metrics enhance the 
understanding within network analysis by looking at the interaction between nodes and 
ranking, of which node scores highest between the different measures. 
There are methods in which nodes can be intermixed to have optimal results to 
improve organizational productivity in specific situations. Art Kleiner describes how 
placing a gatekeeper in an innovative network and having that individual tied with a 
pulsetaker in an expert network can increase learning in a company.58 The informal 
connections within a network structure are extremely important to know so they can be 
effectively used to improve organizational capacity and capability. Organizations would 
be remiss not to include personnel that resemble Stephenson’s hubs, pulsetakers, and 
gatekeepers strategically around their organization.  
Organizations may take on different and/or multiple types of social networks at 
the same time, such as trust, communication, and friendship networks.59 Running SNA 
metrics against each of these social networks within or across organizations will reveal 
information relevant to understand how particular networks function. SNA metrics can 
also reveal key patterns in different social networks within a single organization. The 
structural characteristics should be weighed differently depending on the type 
unit/organization being looked at.  
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c. Sociograms 
SNA “sociograms” are “a visual representation of a network developed through 
theory with the actors represented by nodes, and their relationships represented by links 
or lines”60 (Figure 1). As an analytical tool to explain network data, sociograms date back 
to J.L. Moreno’s sociology studies in the 1930s. To explain the relationships within his 
data, Moreno used graphic to map the relationships of individuals.61 Figure 1 was one of 
the first documented cases in which graphs were used to help visualize and analyze 
network data. When applied correctly to analysis, sociograms help to leverage networks 
at different times across different environments. This leverage can manifest itself in ways 
that strengthen or weaken a network depending on the situation. Pfeffer summarized that 
an organization that has strategic relationships will have more influential power. He 
stated that “to develop influence, we need to be plugged into the structure of 
communication and interaction, and that means seeking out interactions, even social 
interactions strategically.”62 There are many ways to adjust how PSFs can build influence 
and thus increase their ability to project power and also deter malignant actors. After 
analysis is completed on PSF networks, a consensus must be made to use its capabilities 
based on their external network dynamics to include shared formal and informal ties, 
current level of influence, and political connectivity.  
3. Current Military SNA Approaches  
SNA demonstrates that understanding and hypothetically predicting future 
behavior of a group can be achieved by identifying how individuals are structurally 
located and connected within that group. The ties observed within a network can reveal 
network characteristics that can often be missed by casual observers. For example, since 
the aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 2001, the DOD and U.S. intelligence 
communities have explored new ways to study terrorist organizations. One useful 
discipline that emerged was SNA. This discipline indicated that by capturing the right 
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information about an organization, analysts could gain insight into their motivations, 
overall structure, and interactional features. This could also be used together to 
theoretically predict future behavior.  




a. The Academic Approach 
There is limited literature on the application of SNA for the military and even less 
on USSOF-specific applications. The current and narrow literature available 
predominately focuses on counterterrorism examples and studies that examine terrorist 
and other covert organizations. The United States has successfully dedicated resources to 
understanding dark networks but has yet to develop methods to the study of friendly 
organizations. The first step to broaden the application of SNA within the military is to 
compare and contrast how social network theorists like Jörg Raab and Marc Sageman 
apply SNA processes to the study of dark networks. Then we will be able to postulate 
ways in which USSOF can use the same tools for SC events to properly select the most 
optimal units with which to engage.    
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In the early 2000s, Raab conducted research and studies on how network 
characteristics of organizations affect themselves, external organizations, and their 
environments. He analyzed multiple aspects of how some dark networks can be resilient 
and how certain network characteristics and external pressures can affect network 
capabilities. In Dark Networks as Organizational Problems, Sageman, Raab, and H. 
Brinton Milward provided analysis that demonstrates how terrorist organizations undergo 
network characteristics changes and evolution in order to prevent their destruction.64 By 
listing out and observing how dark networks adjust to external pressures Raab provided 
insights that certain behaviors were essential for survival.  
Sageman challenged the mainstream thinking of terrorist organizations in 
understanding terror networks. In the past, government counterterrorism programs were 
based on traditional understanding of terrorism that stood in contract to the types of 
terrorist organizations emerging during the past 15–20 years. Sageman offered a new 
perspective that allowed countries engaged in counterterrorism to develop new and 
effective strategies to disrupt or influence dark networks. By using SNA to dissect Al-
Qaeda using open source research, Sageman discovered valuable insights that explained 
their recruitment, evolution, resiliency, and motivations. His research proved that 
preexisting social ties are usually the precursor for terrorist organizations to acquire new 
members.65 If we want to broaden the application of SNA outside of dark networks, we 
have to look at what these scholars have written and apply those principles to dim 
networks. 
SNA has developed an understanding of the structure of illegal and covert groups 
by examining the groups’ identified relations. When working against covert groups, 
scholars and policy makers alike categorize groups to identify their goals and 
motivations. This categorization leads to strategies designed to influence these groups. 
Whether that influence manifests as tactics to ally with or destroy that organization 
depends upon the category to which a group is assigned.  
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b. Military Doctrine and Publications 
Published works on the application of SNA to light networks that exist in a 
military context are more limited. However, the DOD recently invested in reevaluating 
how the military wins and fights war doctrinally to ensure it maintains relevancy in the 
twenty-first century. Two documents were uncovered that illustrated a small 
advancement in network thinking for the DOD. These useful publications were a Joint 
Warfighting Center publication titled Commander’s Handbook for Attack the Network 
and a Joint Publication 3–15.1, Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations. 
Although both publications are getting the U.S. military to think differently and smarter 
about engaging networks, each title indicates that the emphasis is still focused on threats. 
The military developed a framework within recent publications labeled Attack the 
Network (AtN) to better equip deploying units to be more efficient at Counter Improvised 
Explosive Device operations. The commander’s handbook defines AtN as: 
A focused approach to understanding and operating against a well-defined 
enemy activities—such as terrorism, insurgency, and organized criminal 
actions—that threatens stability in the operational area and is enabled by a 
network of identifiable nodes and links.66   
AtN’s methodology discusses the need to synchronize kinetic and nonkinetic 
targeting, going beyond neutralizing dark networks or threats, to support friendly 
networks, and influence neutral networks.67 The handbook provides a detailed 
description of concepts geared toward engaging, influencing, and eliminating threats 
within an operational environment—a marked improvement over historical publications 
originating within the Joint Force. AtN also incorporates SNA methodologies as a means 
to interdict threat networks. Nonetheless, within the AtN framework, emphasis is placed 
on engaging and understanding all elements of the human domain. This idea is discussed 
throughout the publication; however, the conversation on actual procedures to support 
friendly networks is substituted for interdicting IED threat networks. Although the 
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handbook is not approved for joint doctrine, Joint Publication 3–15.1 incorporates the 
ideas fully throughout the Counter Improvised Explosive Device publication.  
To AtN, commanders and staffs must first understand the operational 
environment in network terms. An important feature of any network is 
adaptability to a changing environment; one change to a node or link may 
substantially affect the entire network.68 
At the time this publication was written and distributed, the wartime focus was on 
eliminating threats at all costs. The publication centers on a Counter Improvised 
Explosive Device state but the methodology can be applied appropriately to situations 
centered on friendly networks as well. The AtN approach breaks down friendly networks 
into Blue (U.S. and Allied Capabilities) and Green Networks (Host Nation Capabilities) 
as illustrated in Figure 2.  
Figure 2.  Friendly networks69  
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The Green Network, which is related to the dim network concept in this study, is 
a key factor to sustaining the Global Special Operations Network and within that network 
the host nation military, and security forces must be capable at eliminating threat 
networks they face. In addition, the PSF must be fully partnered with and engaged by the 
United States, and constantly understood by USSOF to transition from a dim network to 
light network. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Because the United States is currently undergoing changes to signal global 
stability, peacetime engagements will replace major combat operations in the Middle 
East; therefore, an update to the commander’s handbook is necessary. This addition needs 
to capture how the United States can best engage the various networks across the global 
stage with a renewed interest in PSF networks. Different units should be analyzed 
differently depending on their makeup and composition. For example, a tier 1 surgical 
strike unit will be much smaller compared with a conventional infantry unit. In certain 
countries, specific host nation partners are chosen simply because of their preexisting 
mission type or other political reasons. Using metrics to uncover how units compare with 
each other can save time, manpower, resources, and enhance engagements. SNA tools 
can be used to differentiate variables determined by the analysts that give more 
importance to certain attributes over others. However, adding specific weights to 
different variables should always default back to the theater strategic interests of why that 
engagement is occurring.  
  
 34 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 35 
III. CASE ANALYSIS OF SNA USE IN DARK AND LIGHT 
NETWORKS 
Chapter II described what networks are, provided an overview of social networks, 
and outlined the military application of SNA. In Chapter III, we will present two 
examples of how SNA has been applied to a dark and a light network. By showing its 
utility in these two networks, we attempt to make the case that with all things being 
equal, SNA could have the same utility for dim networks. Both cases are unique in their 
composition. The selected dark network is actor-specific, whereas the selected light 
network is predominantly organizationally specific. Each network maintains certain 
characteristics that can be found in PSF networks, both overt and covert. This chapter 
will identify those characteristics and how they converge and diverge with those 
characteristics found in dim networks.   
A. OVERVIEW  
“Viewing the detailed structure of a community we see the concrete 
position of every individual in it, also, a nucleus of relations around every 
individual which is ‘thicker’ around some individuals, ‘thinner’ around 
others. This nucleus of relations is the small social structure in a 
community, a social atom.”70 
—Jacob L. Moreno 
 
The previous chapter described how much of the defense-related research has 
focused on understanding and mapping terrorist organizations or dark networks. 
Recently, literature circulating within these communities indicates the importance of the 
utilization of networks, writ large, to benefit the U.S. government, especially in times of 
diminishing resources. Some of this literature explores the application of SNA on light 
networks that exist in an SC context. SNA can help develop an improved consistency in 
SC by collecting accurate data on friendly networks. Through the tools of this analysis, 
the influential actors and critical characteristics of organizations can become visible.  
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Inside the spectrum of networks, the scale is bidirectional with limits of dark to 
light. Depending on the purpose of a certain network, it can be categorized anywhere in 
this spectrum. Dark networks are composed of elements that are both aware and unaware 
to the nature of the network. The elements that are witting take efforts to conceal their 
involvement in the network as well as seek to disguise the signature of the network to 
remain as clandestine or covert as possible. Without a certain degree of knowledge, a 
person cannot identify that a network exists nor infer that it exists. There are certain 
identifying features of a dark network that assist in identifying its existence and 
topographically mapping it.   
Networks can be identified by their network topology and by the actions of those 
in the network, whether or not they are aware of their role within the network itself. Once 
actors are identified, investigation into their personal connections will further illuminate 
that network. The goal is to gather enough data to move that network from dim to the 
dark end of the spectrum or the light end. Until the network is light, it must go through 
the dim portion of the network. The dim portion characterizes a network that is known to 
exist but no data or not enough data have been gathered. Dim networks can be both 
malign and benign networks. This research focused on the friendly networks surrounding 
SC and labeled them dim networks because of the incompleteness of data on the PSF. 
From their inception, light networks can exist solely on the light end of the spectrum. 
Additionally, an overt network with elements that are not witting to the networks 
structure can exist as a dim network. Connections can be identified and solidified moving 
that network from a dim network to a light network. SNA principles and measures can 
progress a network from dark to light and dim to light. Furthermore, at any point in the 
spectrum, SNA measures can be used to both further illuminate the network and 
understand the dynamics within the networks topography. The following cases 
demonstrate this utility for both dark and light networks.   
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B. DARK NETWORKS  
In Dark Networks as Problems, Raab and Milward define dark networks as covert 
and illegal networks.71 This term can apply to a range of illicit networks, from drug 
trafficking and blood diamond networks to the terrorist group Al-Qaeda. Dark networks 
can also include the examples of resistance groups that formed in France during World 
War II and the Viet Cong. Analysis shows that the organizations are able to adapt and 
evolve their respective networks based on the external pressures applied to them within 
their environments. Milward contends that dark networks must be “hyper-flexible” to 
survive.72 This characteristic makes the effective targeting of these networks very 
difficult; however, the advantage dark networks have enjoyed is being eroded through the 
application of SNA.   
1. Noordin Top Terrorist Network 
This case study provides a clear and understandable example of a typical dark 
network that took formed in Southeast Asia, specifically Indonesia. The Noordin Top 
Terrorist Network was a nebulous network that capitalized on decentralization to conduct 
numerous terrorist acts in Southeast Asia. Additionally, the application of SNA in this 
particular case provides a link to its capabilities in influencing the military decision and 
making process in regards to course of action selection. 
Noordin Top, before his death in 2009, was considered the most wanted terrorist 
in Southeast Asia.73 He was widely believed to be the self-proclaimed leader of the 
military wing of Jemaah Islamiya, while maintaining the roles of key financier and bomb 
maker.74 In April 2005, Top reportedly claimed that he was the head of the working 
group for the Malay Archipelago of al-Qaeda.75 Top has directly been linked to 
numerous bombings against “Western” targets, beginning with the October 2002 Bali 
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bombing and the Jakarta bombings of the Marriott and the Ritz-Carlton in July 2009.76 
The International Crisis Group (ICG), which states that it is an “independent, non-profit, 
non-governmental organization committed to preventing and resolving deadly conflict,”77 
published a report chronicling Noordin Top’s activities and his use of networks to carry 
out his vision of global jihad. This report was titled, “Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin’s 
Networks.”78  
To map, visualize, and analyze Top’s networks, students at the Naval 
Postgraduate School used SNA programs and coded the Noordin Top Terrorist Network 
Data.79 These data were taken largely from the ICG report. Primarily, relational data 
were collected and coded. These data included the group’s organizational ties with 
schools, businesses, religious institutions, and, of course, other terrorist groups. It also 
included person-to-person ties such as kinships friendships and shared affiliations, such 
as classmates or being members of the same organizations.  
Everton and Nancy Roberts supervised the students that coded the Noordin Top 
data and have independently continued to research Top’s networks. They display their 
knowledge of these networks as well as their expertise in applying SNA to the particular 
problem set of dark networks in their article, “Strategies for Combating Dark 
Networks.”80 In their article, the authors demonstrate how the application of SNA on 
dark networks can provide military leaders and planners with courses of actions based on 
a desire approach and kinetic or nonkinetic methods.81 Additionally, their purpose for 
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writing the article was to highlight the need of alternate counterterrorism strategies that 
are “context-dependent rather than letting social network analysis metrics define and 
drive a particular strategy.”82  
a. Data Structuring   
Everton and Roberts used one- and two-mode83 relational and affiliation network 
data84 from the ICG 2006 report. Relational ties consisted of friendship and kinship 
connections. Affiliation connections consisted of both religious and educational ties. 
They structured the data along operational ties, trust ties, and institutional-level ties.85 It 
is important to note that because the Noordin Top network was labeled a dark network, 
the analysts assumed that a tie would likely form between two individuals who share a 
mutual acquaintance and subsequently did not know each other before becoming 
members of the network. This factor is important because it is necessary to outline 
specific assumptions before generating networks to limit the possibility of 
underestimating the number and category of the ties. This is necessary when a network is 
in the dim portion of the spectrum. Certain assumptions must be made to advance the 
network through the spectrum from dark to light. Everton and Roberts generated two one-
mode networks (operational and trust) at the individual level (Figures 3 and 4) and two 
one-mode networks (organizational and educational) at the institutional level (Figures 5 
and 6).86 
When analyzing networks, it is necessary to establish a focus or purposes for the 
analysis. The process of SNA and the plethora of software available that allows this 
analysis to be conducted are all capable of providing extensive amounts of information. 
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Focusing the analysis on aspects of the network that can drive a decision is important, 
especially with regard to a covert network that you seek to disrupt, destroy, or otherwise 
influence. Everton and Roberts provide examples of this focus by way of establishing 
possible courses of actions one might develop for attacking a dark network.   
b. Data Analysis   
 Everton and Roberts present four different courses of action for the purposes of 
demonstrating the utility of SNA. The courses of action were broken down into two that 
focus on a kinetic approach and two on a nonkinetic approach. Within the kinetic and 
nonkinetic approaches, each was broken down further into a course of action for an 
individual network and an organizational network focus. For the purposes of this case 
study, the focus will be on the individual for both nonkinetic and kinetic courses of 
action. The strategies for the organizational networks are similar enough to the individual 
networks that the concepts used are virtually the same: identify the most influential 
nodes.   
 The first course of action was nonkinetic and focused on the individuals in the 
operational network. The purpose of this course of action was to implement a 
psychological operations strategy in order to influence the network toward some ends or 
disseminate a disinformation plan. Essential to any effort to pass information is the level 
of influence or interaction that a node—or person, in this case—has in the network. More 
specifically, a node with a high betweenness centrality score theoretically has the 
capability to reach the most nodes at the quickest rate because of the assumption that the 
information follows the shortest path length. As presented in Table 1, the names in bold 
represent the eight individuals that rank in the top ten of all four centrality measures. 
Using these data, a planner could conceptually develop a strategy to target these 
individuals and have a reasonable degree of certainty that they are targeting the most 
influential individuals. When visualized in Figure 7, the planner could also identify these 
individuals; however, it is recommend that the table and sociograms be used together to 
maximize the understanding of the network and its nodes within the context of the 
analysis.   
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The next course of action is kinetic and focused on the individuals in the trust 
network shown in Figure 4. Typically with kinetic operations, the goal is to remove a 
node from the network, usually through force. Because of the finality of kinetic 
operations, it is important to understand and be aware of possible second- and third-order 
effects. Once these effects are taken into consideration, the target list can be prioritized.   
Table 1.   Top ten individuals in the operational network (by score)87 
 
  
                                                 
87 Ibid., 11. 
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Figure 3.  Operational network (betweenness centrality) 88 
 
 
In this case, the target list is developed through processing the members of the 
trust network along the four-centrality measures (Table 1). The results are in stark 
contrast with the members in the operational network result. Three actors in this network 
are consistently in the top ten of each centrality measure. Interestingly, Noordin Top is 
not the most central. One would logically suspect that Noordin Top would be highly 
central in all the networks based on his position in the overall network. This is a strong 
example of the diversity of results SNA provides. When this network is visualized 
(Figure 4) and the three most central actors are highlighted (blue icons circled in black), it 
becomes apparent that their position is important because of how they connect the core of 
the network to the periphery.89 When presented with this information, a planner or 
targeting officer would have reasonable certainty that eliminating the three most central 
actors would temporarily disconnect the core from the periphery. This action could limit 
the core network’s ability to be effective in conducting terrorist activities.90  
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Figure 4.  Trust network (core in blue; periphery in red)91 
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Figure 6.  Trust network93 
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Figure 7.  Terrorist organizational network94 
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Figure 8.  Terrorist education network95 
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2. Summary 
The study of Noordin Top’s terrorist network provides a clear example of the 
utility of SNA in illuminating a dark network. Everton and Roberts’ article provides 
excellent examples of the characteristics of dark networks and how SNA tools can turn 
scattered data points, such as kinship ties, into focused results. Connecting these results to 
defined courses of action shows how understanding the network through the context of 
centrality provides a planner with insight necessary to craft a kinetic or nonkinetic 
targeting strategy.  
A central theme within dark networks is information needed to illuminate their 
networks are hidden and covert. There is no single strategy that can eliminate dark 
networks because of their ability to adapt and evolve past the point of extinction. 
However, methodologies do exist that allow strategists to increase their chances of 
designing efficient and effective ways to eliminate the threats posed by these groups. In 
the case of Noordin Top’s network, the uncovered data created insight into their network 
structure and network characteristics. Centrality is salient in this example; however, other 
aspects of network analysis assisted in the development of courses of action. One such 
aspect is the measurement of the network’s density. Network density describes the 
number of potential connections that exist a network that are actual connections. The 
aggregated density score of the operational network was 0.307. Compared with the trust 
network (0.84), the operational network is more dense. Identifying the density of 
networks further allows the planner to determine where to invest more effort and 
resources, depending on the desired outcome. In this case, the planner could assume that 
effects could be achieved faster by targeting the operational network because of its higher 
number of actual connects. More identified connections could mean more opportunities 
for exploitation and a higher threshold for the risk of failure. 
C. LIGHT NETWORKS  
This section will focus on a light network, its characteristics, and the utility of 
SNA in developing a strategy for that network. Literature surrounding the SNA field is 
filled with examples of the benefits of understanding overt networks. As such, “Bright 
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networks, that is, a legal and overt governance form that is supposed to create advantages 
for the participating actors and to advance the common good and does not—at least 
intentionally—harm people,”96 are open and accessible. The reason these organizations 
are easy to study is due to their openness in society, which allows them to be successful 
and/or survive. Light networks, such as the United Nations, consist of actors or 
organizations that seek out connections and understand their importance for the overall 
success of the network. Light networks can also exist without the actors within them 
knowing they are connected or actively seeking to leverage that connection. Fans of a 
professional sports team openly advertise their affiliation with that team. The fans are all 
mutually connected through this affiliation, but do not necessarily operate as a cohesive 
network outside of this shared allegiance to the team.   
Concepts surrounding this discipline continue to reflect that relational ties and 
network characteristics can indicate significant meanings within that network, as Raab 
and Milward state: “If covert networks, like overt networks, are also characterized by a 
need to integrate functionally or geographically differentiated elements, then the most 
likely way to disrupt them is to attempt to find the link that joins as many of these 
differentiated elements as possible.”97 A fundamental approach to forming concrete 
military alliances around the world is to determine how these alliances are held together 
and what is potentially missing within these military partnerships. Consequently, because 
of the military and security applications of SNA being mostly dedicated to dark networks, 
approaches to light networks are lacking. However, this trend is beginning to change.   
The next case demonstrates how understanding light networks is increasingly 
important in environments where all actors are linked in one-way or another. In addition, 
this case identified a shortcoming in the military study of light networks. The study of the 
humanitarian assistance networks in Tajikistan provides a great example of a dim 
network that progresses to a light network. What sets the network apart from a dark 
network and is that the organizations in this network are overt and advertise their 
relationships so collection methods must be developed for it differently. Actors do not 
                                                 
96 Raab and Milward, 419.  
97 Ibid., 435. 
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always realize they are in a light network, so data necessary to map these networks out 
can be collected relatively easy through normal interactions during engagements.  
1. Humanitarian Assistance Networks in Tajikistan  
This case provides a clear and understandable example of a dim network that 
existed in Central Asia that was illuminated into a light network. Tajikistan was the 
poorest state in the former Soviet Union. Consequently, after the fall of the Soviet Union, 
Tajikistan has remained one of the poorest countries in world.98 Being a second-world 
developing country, numerous organizations operate in Tajikistan to provide aid and 
assistance due to widespread poverty.  
Two U.S. Army Civil Affair officers, Majors Jeff Han and Ryan Schloesser, 
identified the humanitarian assistance network in Tajikistan. These officers wanted to 
improve Civil Military Support Elements (CMSE) capabilities in meeting Civil Military 
Engagement objectives in Tajikistan. CMSEs “build partner capacity in a preventive, 
population-centric, and indirect approach to enhance the capability, capacity, and 
legitimacy of partnered indigenous governments.”99 CMSEs typically collaborate with 
numerous humanitarian organizations both international and local to address population 
grievances that exist in the host nation. Han and Schloesser recognized that for CMSEs in 
Tajikistan to be effect, they must identify the most relevant actors in the humanitarian 
assistance network. The network that they mapped had numerous different forms of 
nodes. This included NGOs, intergovernmental organizations, domestic governmental 
organizations, religious charities, and financial and commercial organizations. Han and 
Schloesser understood that a network existed that CMSEs could leverage to optimize 
their engagement strategies. This network is a good example of our dim network concept.   
The purpose for Han and Schloesser’s research was not only to develop the 
humanitarian assistance network, but also to use the results of SNA to help develop 
different strategies for advancing the capabilities, capacity, and legitimacy of partnered 
                                                 
98 Global Finance lists Tajikistan as the thirty-third poorest country in the world in 2015. 
https://www.gfmag.com/global-data/economic-data/the-poorest-countries-in-the-world?page=12. 
99 U.S. Army. ATP 3–57.80: Civil Military Engagement (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 
2013), 4–1. 
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indigenous governments. Through the use of SNA-produced metrics, they were able 
identify the most influential actors in the network and leverage those actors to suit a 
specific strategy.  
a. Data Structuring   
The research set out to identify the most influential organizations within the 
unmapped humanitarian assistance network of Tajikistan. Second, it seeks to answer 
what strategy can USSOF units, specifically Civil Affairs teams, implement to sustain 
long-term stability in Tajikistan? To accomplish this, researchers Han and Schloesser 
began by conducting open source research to list the organizations that fit this category, 
and then categorized any relevant connections the listed organizations displayed on their 
websites. It is important to note that their approach used relational ties that were overt 
and openly disclosed. This is a key characteristic of a light network; however, before 
these ties are analyzed and mapped, the network remains dim.   
 Moving the network from dim to light required searching the Internet for any 
missing information they could not obtain from the organizations websites. They used 
Palantir-developed software that takes data from multiple sources and fuses the data into 
human centric models. Palantir data analysis software was used to “tag” or highlight the 
relevant information from the open-source research that amounted to: “308 entities, 97 of 
which are location types, 166 are organization types, 42 are individuals, and 169 are 
event types.”100 Figure 9 illustrates the complex humanitarian network formed after the 
relational ties were input into Palantir. The blue lines indicate relational ties between two 
nodes, and the orange icons represent the nodes, or an individual humanitarian 
organization, individual, event, or location. This link analysis graph indicates that several 
nodes have significantly more connections as compared to other nodes. There are also 
isolates, or nodes, that share no observed ties to any other node in the network.   
                                                 
100 Jeffrey Han and Ryan Schloesser, “Joining the Helping Hand: Understanding the Humanitarian 
Assistance Network in Tajikistan” (unpublished paper Naval Postgraduate School, 2014), 5.   
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b. Data Analysis   
 To answer the research question pertaining to the humanitarian network, the 
researchers were required to only focus on the social network with the same class that 
included only organizations. They isolated the other nodes (events, locations, and 
individuals) and the present network included 168 organizations or nodes.101 This was to 
determine which organization within this network was the most influential based on its 
network characteristics and its scores across various SNA metrics. 
 
Figure 9.  Tajikistan humanization assistance link diagram102  
 
  
                                                 
101 Ibid., 8–9.  
102 Ibid., 7.  
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First, by observing the sociograms illustration, they were able to identify the most 
central organizations within the network. Those central organizations can be extremely 
influential and powerful based on their structural location. Second, they ran metrics to see 
if the scores corresponded to the initial observations using the four-centrality measures: 
Degree, Betweenness Centrality, Eigenvector Centrality, and Closeness Centrality.104 
Both the sociogram and the SNA metrics indicated the most influential humanitarian 
networks within Tajikistan. 
  
                                                 
103 Ibid., 11. 
104 Ibid., 12. 
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Highlighted in yellow is the Aga Khan Development Network. It consistently 
ranked at the top of each centrality measure. Han and Schloesser identified that the top 
five actors in closeness centrality were all members of the Institute for International 
Cooperation of the Deutscher Volkshochschul-Verband e.V. sub-network listed as DVV 
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International (indicated by the red outline). Therefore, the actual position of the Aga 
Khan Development Network could be assumed to be higher than its listed position as 
sixth in closeness centralization. Save the Children and Agency for Technical 
Cooperation and Development are also dominant in their centrality. These organizations 
are prominent NGOs that are chartered to provide certain services to address grievances 
and shortcomings of the host nation. The results produced through SNA provide CMSEs 
with the necessary focus to develop a strategy that leverages the influence these 
organizations maintain in the humanitarian assistance network.   
2. Summary 
The analysis of the humanitarian network in Tajikistan provides a concise 
example of how to transition a dim network to a light network as well as the utility of 
SNA when applied to a light network. In addition to providing insight into the level of 
influence certain NGOs have within the network, the study showed how mapping the 
network could lead to additional understanding of a complex environment through the 
identification of other substantial actors previously thought to be non-influential. These 
include domestic and international governmental organizations. Han and Schloesser 
showed that the belief that NGOs and charities were the sole agencies conducting 
humanitarian efforts to be untrue in this case. Similarly, many PSF units are believed to 
have a certain level of influence in security matters and are therefore targeted for 
continued partnership.105  
This research demonstrated that mapping out the human domain in steady-state 
operations is essential to future USSOF operations. They drew on an existing model for 
adapting social movement theory into USSOF operations as a requirement to be able to 
effectively analyze existing networks, which in turn will effectively build USSOF 
networks.106 As a sample network, they analyzed indigenous organizations. Within 
                                                 
105 In some instances, that perception is perpetuated by the host nation despite the truth that the unit in 
question is mostly ceremonial. This is ironically the case with certain Tajik military units. One such unit is 
the Tajik National Guard. Despite the unit’s title, it is the private guard of the president of Tajikistan.    
106 Han and Schloesser, “Quantifying the Indirect Approach: Understanding and Applying Network 
Development in Special Operations” (Thesis: Naval Postgraduate School, March 2015). 
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indigenous organizations, there are members, established structure of solidary incentives, 
communication, and leaders. By looking at these organizations from a network theory 
perspective, analysts could determine motivations of its members. For example, when 
participants believe the system they were part of was unjust and open for change, they are 
likely to mobilize and join some of the anti-state establishments.107 This represented an 
advanced position to use network characteristics to achieve stable USSOF networks that 
have the ability to manipulate their environment when needed. 
3. Relevance to Research  
Although both studies analyze different networks, the techniques and tools can be 
used to examine all type of networks. The benefit of studying friendly networks is that 
information about the organizations is usually open, not hidden, and can be routinely 
collected during engagements. The dark and light network cases indicate that the more 
reliable information one has, the more one will understand about that network and the 
entirety of the operating environment. These networks begin as dim networks. Identifying 
the actors through their actions or events they are involved in is critical to moving the 
network from dim to light or dim to dark.   
Gathering the data necessary to map a dark network differs from gathering the 
data for a light network. The covertness of the dark network limits the available sources 
for mapping this network through noninvasive means. Certain intelligence and 
information-gathering techniques may have to be used to gather the necessary 
information to map a dark network. However, once certain actors or events are identified, 
open-source research becomes more effective. Consequently, because of most 
intelligence requirements being focused on dark networks, data collection though 
intensive labor is less difficult. Open-source information on light networks tends to be 
more available through most mediums such as the Internet and publications. The 
openness of light networks allows for greater availability of information. Additionally, 
because of the openness of light networks, overt information-gathering techniques can be 
                                                 
107 Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 32. 
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used to obtain more detailed information on operational and relational ties. However, 
because of the emphasis placed on dark network–related information and intelligence, 
reporting these ties about light network actors is not a priority.  
Once a network is believed to exist and at least two or more actors are identified, 
the network should be considered dim. Additional significant properties that characterize 
dim networks will be discussed in the proceeding chapters. Based on the actions of the 
actors, a determination can be made as to which side of the spectrum the network will 
move toward; bad to dark, good to light. With this being the case, when a dim network is 
identified, the analyst must initially fuse data gathering techniques from both dark and 
light networks to begin to map the identified network.  
Networks largely consist of people, relationships, and boundaries but can also be 
other things as well. To understand how these elements relate to one another for the 
creation of a network, certain steps must be completed. When SNA is applied to network 
development, it illustrates how particular dynamics within a network represent 
opportunities to leverage and influence based on connections, fractions within the 
network, and or the networks structural location. However, correct data about the 




IV. PSF DIM NETWORK CASE 
“You can’t attack a network with a field army. Instead, it takes a 
willingness to field a nimble, networked force of your own.”108 
—Dr. John Arquilla 
 
Chapter III presented two case studies to illustrate how dark and light network 
characteristics can be applied to SNA of dim networks. The techniques identified in the 
previous chapter’s case studies will be used to understand organizational networks 
involved during a crisis surrounding a specific incident in the Philippines involving U.S. 
PSFs. This case will indicate what steps will need to be implemented to effectively 
integrate a SNA methodology into security cooperation events. This chapter will analyze 
the crisis to identify how understanding the dim networks of the partner security force 
could have aided the efforts of the Government of the Philippines (GPH). Additionally, 
this chapter will present themes identified from current reporting requirements that 
should be refocused toward peacetime operations.   
An overview of the 2013 Zamboanga City Crisis and precipitating events will be 
presented as a case study, followed by a description of how SNA could strengthen the 
understanding of dim networks surrounding this incident. A significant amount of SC 
events have been executed in the Philippines. This chapter will discuss what information 
would be needed to map and understand friendly networks using SNA by examining 
USSOF data collection methods. Additionally, the case study will be further analyzed to 
illustrate missed opportunities and how an understanding of the friendly dim network 
could be leveraged to shape better outcomes.  
Dim is a description of the state a network is in based on the data available. This 
neutral state is the transitional position of both dark and light networks. The identification 
of a dim network is similar to that of a dark network. In the context of an overt or friendly 
network, dim is the state in which a perceived network exists if that network is not known 
                                                 
108 Arquilla, “How to Win,” Foreign Policy.  
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to its actors but only to the outsider looking in. PSF networks exist in this portion of the 
spectrum. An SC planner knows that the PSF units in a certain country such as the 
Philippines work together for numerous purposes. These purposes can be security 
enforcement missions, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, or training. The planner 
can identify these events, and they can then begin to build a network outlining the 
connections each PSF unit has to one another as well as outside organizations. 
Incrementally, the planner, through mapping the network, moves it through the spectrum 
from dim to light.   
A. PSF IN THE PHILIPPINES  
The DOD, and most recently U.S. Special Operations Command, has maintained 
a long history of cooperation with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The 
contextual background of this relationship is by far too extensive to detail in this chapter; 
however, the recent relationship will be discussed as it pertains to the methodology 
forging the proposed framework. USSOF has advised and assisted the AFP’s 
counterterrorism campaign. This relationship extends far beyond the extensive training 
programs created and developed for the AFP but spreads to operational support. 
Recently, USSOF advisors have been embedded with AFP USSOF units to ensure this 
support shapes the progress of the Philippine Internal Peace and Security Plan where the 
AFP transition to external border security and the PNP focus on internal security of the 
country. During this transition, USSOF have also been working with PNP Special Action 
Forces as they increase their respective security role, while developing partnerships with 
governmental and NGO agencies in the Southern Philippines to ensure the reasons that 
lead to the insurgency problem are appropriately addressed.  
In theory, understanding and leveraging networks in a foreign country are 
cornerstones of USSOF missions. However, more often than not USSOF teams have high 
turnover rates of personnel and over time, specific missions can shift to other teams or 
even to different companies, battalions, or groups. When this occurs, the personal 
knowledge and understanding pertaining to specific networks can be lost and/or buried in 
outdated and obsolete reporting that could potentially never resurface again. What is 
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needed is a tangible output that transcends all types of reporting and remains important 
from the value of its analysis. SNA can be used to bridge the gap needed to understand 
environments in which USSOF operators are embedded to overcome the problems 
created from the current reporting mechanisms and swapping of the unit personnel. As 
the United States invests considerably more resources in foreign partnerships, peacetime 
engagements will undoubtedly increase as cost-effective ways to increase these 
partnerships and maintain stability in the area.  
Recent military relations between the countries include both enduring 
engagements from the combat advisory mission of the Joint Special Operations Task 
Force – Philippines (JSOTF-P) to episodic engagements underneath a theater security 
cooperation program. According to David Rothkopf in his article in Foreign Policy, 
“Does America Need New ‘Special Relationships’?” forming new and influential 
relationships has to begin by looking at existing alliances and revitalizing them to meet 
current times.109 Capacity building is used to project U.S. influence in particular areas 
and deter acts from malevolent actors. The United States can create these special 
relationships using focused military capacity-building efforts. Additional by-products of 
military advising and assisting are an enhanced understanding of the operating 
environment. To develop long-term and sustained influence after the departure of U.S. 
Forces, a comprehensive understanding of the environment is necessary. PACOM via 
JSOTF-P has been successful working with the GPH primarily through the PSF to 
improve its capacity to combat terrorism throughout Mindanao while attempting to 
establish USSOF networks. However, what was missing was a comprehensive 
understanding of how the partner forces are interconnected with each other. Malevolent 
actors have far less freedom to maneuver compared with what was available before 2001; 
nonetheless, they persistently operate throughout the Philippines challenging the national 
government.  
                                                 
109 David Rothkopf, “Does America Need New ‘Special Relationships?’ “Foreign Policy, August 4, 
2015.  
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B. ZAMBOANGA CITY CRISIS BACKGROUND 
The GPH has been involved in a long peace process with the Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF) in Southern Mindanao, the Philippines. In 1996, an agreement 
between both parties created the Automatous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Nur Musari, 
then-chairman of the MNLF, became the Automatous Region in Muslim Mindanao’s first 
governor in 1996, serving through 2002.110 Most recently, the GPH has been involved 
with peace talks with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, a splinter group of the MNLF. 
Factions within the MNLF have viewed the Moro Islamic Liberation Front-GPH peace 
talks negatively over concerns of derailment of the 1996 agreement. On September 9, 
2013, rogue MNLF Elements (Rogue Moro National Liberation Front Element [RME]) 
led by commander Ustadz Habier Malik staged an attack in Zamboanga over this 
dissatisfaction.111 The crisis provides an example of a joint operation that the local and 
national government, security forces, and NGOs worked together to end. The question 
remains whether this situation provides opportunity to study network structure and 
network characteristics of the friendly forces surrounding the incident to create the 
framework needed to fully integrate this approach into future SC events.  
C. OBSERVATIONS FROM ZAMBOANGA CITY 
The Zamboanga City Crisis was a unique situation because it occurred during a 
time when JSOTF-P’s mission was ending due to the Philippine military gains in 
combating terrorism across Southern Mindanao. This incident represents the evolution of 
the AFP’s capabilities while demonstrating to the United States the importance of truly 
understanding military networks. The devastation caused by the RME and the 
complicated bureaucratic operations resulted in a 3-week siege.112 Several things can be 
observed about communication and relational ties during the crisis that reveal something 
that can be done better. Primarily, a well-synchronized and collaborative effort at the 
                                                 
110 Carmela Fonbuena, “Zamboanga Siege: Tales from the Combat Zone, September 13, 2014. 
http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/68885-zamboanga-siege-light-reaction-battalion.  
111 Ibid.  
112 The author was assigned to JSOTF-P during this incident and provides first-hand information to 
cover any gaps that the research was unable to fill.   
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individual and organizational level is needed for an effective response to a crisis 
situation. Unfortunately, both the GPH and JSOTF-P did not have the information 
necessary to illuminate the dim networks involved.113  
The presence of these dim networks directly validates the counterterrorism focus 
of both the host nation and JSOTF-P from 2001 to the present. There was a lack of 
information available to government and U.S. forces to illustrate how the recovery and 
security organizations on the ground were networked, both independently and 
collectively. Significant planning delays resulted because of the time it took to gather 
information about who was involved, what their capabilities were, and what their specific 
roles would be. Equally important, there was no mechanism to foster collaboration 
amongst agencies. This lack caused several days of inaction where the RME were able to 
strengthen their fighting positions and the AFP and PNP awaited a political solution. If 
the past SC events executed in the Philippines had collected this information, the typical 
Filipino response network could have been mapped out using SNA software. This 
analysis would supplement the decision making of the host nation to prevent delays in 
their response to the crisis.  
The lack of knowledge about the PSFs’ networks was mitigated by JSOTF-P’s 
presence in Zamboanga. The Light Reaction Companies (LRC)114 was instrumental in 
the success of the operation. Through persistent engagement and training by USSOF, the 
LRC’s developed the capability and capacity to conduct hostage rescue operations, close 
quarter combat, and precision marksmanship. These capabilities answer the question 
about the ability of the partner force to successfully respond to a crisis situation but failed 
to account for how this happened from a network perspective.  
 
 
                                                 
113 This is strictly limited to an SNA context. There was a lack of sufficient information to make the 
connections of the security forces to external organizations. Additionally, little information about 
individual and organizational network characteristics was known. 
114 The LRC are a Philippine special operations unit created and trained by USSOF.  
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Figure 11.  Sample network of organizations involved during Zamboanga City 




Figure 11 is a network of the PSFs involved during the crisis. This information 
was obtained from the AFP after action reporting and Filipino open-source reporting 
from the Internet. The black icons on the top right of the graph illustrate the AFP USSOF 
units involved during the crisis. The green icons directly below show the superimposed 
conventional AFP units involved. JSOTF-P was able to use the connections it had within 
the leadership of the Philippine special operations units to help shape the outcome. This 
was due in part to USSOF advisors being co-located with their host nation counterparts 
and contributing to collaborative efforts on the ground in time-effective ways. USSOF 
does not always have this luxury to assist allies in this way during a time of crisis. The 
lack of knowledge about the networks was thereby mitigated by direct intervention and 
support from JSOTF-P.  
                                                 
115 Data for this study originate from open-source research and unclassified portions from the Special 
Operations Command Pacific that are available from the special operations command Pacific (SOCAC) 
portal. 
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The next finding observed on the ground was that a weak communication network 
existed in the early stages of the crisis. There were times that the organizations involved 
questioned who was in charge of operations (i.e., whether the local or national 
government). Figure 12 shows how the security forces were connected to each other and 
how they were linked with the RME, but fails to account for external connections to any 
nonsecurity agencies.  
Figure 12.  Sample network of organizations involved during the Zamboanga 




Understanding crisis communication networks would eliminate unnecessary time 
being dedicated to nonessential tasks. Initially there were several organizations working 
to understand how to communicate effectively during the crisis, which delayed necessary 
actions taking place. Unfortunately, no JSOTF-P personnel were permitted to attend the 
host nation synchronized planning meetings that subsequently took place during the latter 
                                                 
116 The data from which these sociograms derived originated from open-source Internet searches of 
the 2014 Zamboanga crisis and unpublished reports obtained from the Armed Forces of the Philippines.  
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part of the incident. This prevented the collection of information necessary to map out 
how the communication network looked from a SNA perspective. 
The security forces, governmental and nongovernmental offices, and international 
organizations each maintained headquarters elements and separate field teams that 
composed organic subgroups within their organizations. These subgroups were the action 
arms of the agencies and early interagency synchronization would have allowed for more 
effective cooperation.117 Many of these subgroups maintained their own networks and 
additional opportunities were present to seek additional connections and/or strengthen the 
preexisting relations. There were indications on the ground that subgroups lacked 
sufficient ties to subgroups of other agencies. This barrier impacted communication by 
creating bottlenecks, which led to a duplication of effort with minimal initial 
collaboration.  
Resources sent by the GPH and U.S. government were disproportionately 
distributed and were being sent to organizations that, in large part, maintained direct ties 
to the government. JSOTF-P elements helped to coordinate developmental agency efforts 
to mitigate the communication issues with organizations that were not receiving 
resources from an inherent lack of relational ties to influential personnel within the local 
or national governments. Pfeffer, in Managing with Power, states, “Social networks are, 
then, structures that can be built deliberately, and our place in the network of 
communication is something that is under our own control.”118 A lack of understanding 
of the existing communication network during the crisis led to more time and resources 
directed toward alleviating some of the initial redundant problems. By mapping out the 
organizations involved, their relationships, and network characteristics, early 
identification of key areas and/or gaps would have been known from the start. In 
addition, resources would have been distributed more rapidly, which would have 
significantly decreased the demands of the security force personnel throughout the crisis.  
                                                 
117 The coordination clusters executed by the LGU corrected these early synchronization issues. These 
clusters identified responsibilities of each agency during the recovery to foster collaboration. 
118 Pfeffer, Managing with Power: Politics and Influence in Organizations, 125. 
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D. SNA AND PSF SELECTION 
The principles and tools used to study covert organizations can be applied to 
develop a comprehensive approach to the study of friendly networks. This section will 
pull in theories presented earlier to support the Zamboanga application. Now that the 
mission has concluded, it is important to derive lessons learned to improve future 
strategies and highlight how understanding networks can be beneficial writ large. This 
section will show how SNA illumination of dim networks can solve the problems 
identified during this crisis as well as offer added benefits.  
        The networks available during a crisis situation are important to analyze to 
determine how organizations can be expected to behave in similar situations. Figure 13 
shows the military units involved during the Zamboanga City Crisis. This diagram 
highlights the AFP USSOF units on which USSOF focuses its engagement strategy 
within the Philippines. The focus on SOF-specific units is telling for multiple reasons. 
The first is that this signifies that the GCC engagement strategy for the Philippines is 
successful as the units being engaged directly respond to national crisis and, although 
dimly lit, have connections to other agencies involved during national crisis. At this time, 
it remains to be seen if these units are the optimal units located in the Philippines. 
Relationships and networks will continue to change as the Philippines progress through 
the Philippine Internal Peace and Security Plan. There must be a system in place to 
collect the necessary data to measure these connections.  
The next finding is that the USSOF within the AFP must work alongside the 
conventional military units and PNP units during security threats. This amounts to 
unexploited opportunities to engage other partner units that operate in the environment 
that could possibly have more substantial influential relationships, which could have been 
efficiently leveraged during the crisis.  
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Figure 13.  Network of SOF units (highlighted) involved during the 




The network presented represents additional opportunities to influence the 
environment by determining key and influential actors within the network to see how 
they are connected and whom they are connected to. This would allow for the creation of 
more focused engagements while allowing the PSF opportunities to see the strengths and 
weaknesses in their network organization. Unfortunately, information about the 
connections to the local government units, national government agencies, 
intergovernmental organization, and NGOs is missing. Without these important relational 
ties illustrated, the friendly forces that share several annual SC events with the United 
States will remain dim networks.  
                                                 
119 Data for this study originate from open-source research and unclassified portions from Special 
Operations Command Pacific that are available from the special operations command Pacific (SOCAC) 
portal. 
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E. SNA IN THE AFTERMATH  
If SNA is to be used to transition dim networks to light networks across the dark-
light spectrum, we see by looking at the Zamboanga City Crisis that the correct data to do 
this are not being collected. The foundation for this analysis is network relational data. 
This includes data collection from engagements, exercises and open-source research, and 
proper data structuring. The analysts may use different formats for reporting (i.e., Word 
or Excel documents), but whatever instrument chosen, it must be compatible with SNA 
software. This section will describe techniques to incorporate data collection into 
engagements to ensure the necessary data to profile dim networks are collected. The steps 
presented can be used in any situation and are not limited to a crisis. 
The first step is to identify all the relevant organizations, or nodes, which are 
required to mobilize in a time of crisis. This could simply be all security force elements, 
all relevant intergovernmental organizations and NGOs, and other influential agencies 
within the government. JSOTF-P knew that the LRC and other AFP USSOF units would 
be involved, but was unaware of the involvement of other organizations. Information 
about the organization necessarily includes but is not limited to: size; resources; 
authorities; internal associations; external associations (criminal organizations, 
governmental organizations, police and military organizations, international 
organizations, media; NGOs, political, religious, and terrorists); and executed events 
(date/location).120 What was known about the units JSOTF-P engaged with was focused 
on internal characteristics of that organization (i.e., composition, leadership, and 
organizational capabilities). Information about relational connections to external 
organizations was missing; this information is important to know when organizations 
work together. Figure 14 represents the network composed of the AFP and PNP units the 
United States engages with during the multitude of annual SC events that take place in 
the country. On the surface, this limited network identifies collective relations with units 
based on the shared events but does not account for relational ties outside of the 
exercises; nor does this limited network account for other attributes that could contribute 
                                                 
120 Data fields within these steps are taken from the SOCOM Code Book. A codebook ensures the 
data being collected are consistent and structured properly to ensure accurate analysis occurs.  
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to a better understanding of these units, their network characteristics, or network 
structure.  
The information needed to conduct the analysis is somewhat contained within 
various sections of existing reporting, yet it is not identified as being important 
information to collect. SNA will produce outputs and analysis that illustrate the 
significance of this information to all stakeholders involved. This will help prevent 
complacency, demonstrated by the reuse of old information as seen in chronological 
operational reporting from the repeated exercises conducted with the same PSF. 
Historically JSOTF-P personnel have had enough experience in the country to capture 
this information over time to illuminate these dim networks but solely focused on 
capturing the type of data necessary to understand dark networks. The outcome of this 
step is to determine if the node is in fact realistically structured and capable of 
mobilization in the time of a crisis. 
The next step is to determine the ties between nodes within the network. These 
ties can be multi-relational to include: kinship; relationship; business/operational; shared 
membership; or acquaintance. This can include historical or present connections. For 
example, during the Zamboanga City crisis, an analyst could link PSFs that conducted 
joint operations together or all agencies listed in the same recovery clusters. 
Unfortunately, these ties were not observed until days into the crisis. It is necessary to 
define what constitutes a tie to eliminate inconsistencies in relational patterns within the 
network. This is usually done with a codebook to ensure relational definitions are 
objective, can be easily duplicated for further analysis, and not misunderstood. Capturing 
various types of relational data is important. The goal here is to determine how nodes 
interact collectively within this network.  
The final step is to determine how nodes are connected to specific events. These 
types of relations can include: associated with; participated in; and victim of.121 A 
majority of the NGOs involved during the crisis response maintained relationships with 
military commanders or government officials that correlated to the support they received 
                                                 
121 For a detailed description of other relational ties reference the SOCOM codebook used to 
construct this methodology for friendly networks.  
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during the crisis. The observed interactional patterns will identify subgroups and illustrate 
the network composition and how it functions. At the completion of this step, the 
information will have to be uploaded into SNA software to produce visualizations and 
view the network’s metrics. Higher echelons of command would ideally be responsible 
for conducting additional analysis and serve as a clearinghouse for continuity purposes to 
ensure the information is collected, analyzed, disseminated, and passed on appropriately.    
F. THE UNSTRUCTURED DATA PROBLEM 
The present state of research on peacetime engagement indicates information 
necessary to illuminate dim networks is not a substantial segment within current reporting 
requirements around the DOD.122 For the analysis to occur, a systematic collection 
method must be developed aimed at capturing relational data. Raab and Milward state, 
“The network concept is useful as an analytical tool because it calls for a systematic 
collection of information about the relations among the social units, be they individuals, 
groups, parts of organizations, or whole organizations.” Bits and pieces of this 
information are located throughout reports produced to meet various reporting 
requirements, but the majority of the data needed to properly illustrate a network is 
missing. For this methodology to be effectively employed to support peacetime 
engagements, a desire to collect and prioritize this information is needed. 
The Special Operations Debrief and Retrieval System reporting format can be 
used, as a tool to enable USSOF to integrate SNA within SC. SODARS is the reporting 
mechanism to capture and distribute information passively acquired by USSOF during 
operational missions. SODARS could be the method to obtain, analyze, and disseminate 
data on the dim networks surrounding host nation–friendly forces. Simple modifications 
to the current structure within these reports would be relatively easy as this is currently an 
existing reporting format used by USSOF. This modification of an existing system would 
eliminate certain bias found in these reports because the information is based on 
observations that would later be analyzed mathematically by SNA software. 
 
                                                 
122 Raab and Milward, 435. 
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The only limitation of using SODARS as the repository of this information is the 
storage of these reports. SODARS are classified by some of the information contained 
within the report itself, so the ability to share this information with host nation forces 
would be problematic. However, the unclassified information used to illustrate these 
networks would be able to be shared with the host nation for them to benefit from this 
analytical tool. Commands must ensure data are collected and structured properly and 
confirm correct analysis is conducted to eliminate error in analysis. SNA tools are 
becoming widely available throughout SOCOM; it will just take guidance from higher 
commands to require the integration of this analysis into peacetime operations.  
                                                 
123 Data for this study originate from open-source research and unclassified portions of the Special 
Operations Command Pacific that are available from the special operations command Pacific (SOCAC) 
portal. 
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G. FINAL THOUGHTS  
The approach described in this chapter can lead to an optimization of SOCPAC’s 
engagement strategy using SNA to identify the networks of the PSF being engaged and 
how influential the network is within the assortment of networks in that country. This 
development will benefit the teams on the ground conducting the exercise in that they 
will begin to understand how the PSF is nested with strategic interests for the United 
States and the host nation and be able to tailor that engagement appropriately. This 
chapter discussed the 2013 Zamboanga City Crisis in an attempt to illustrate the 
importance of how a dim network can be used to interdict threats. This event illustrated 
that any and all PSF relational ties with external organizations is necessary to collect 
during peacetime engagements in order to illuminate any networks prior to the start of 
crisis events. This analysis established an initial framework that enables a commander’s 
engagement plan to be used as a platform to understand and leverage light networks. 
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V. SIMULATED NETWORK 
Chapter IV presented a theory development case used to unpack the application of 
SNA to examine the dim networks surrounding security cooperation. The Zamboanga 
case uncovered several gaps in inability to illuminate dim networks that was linked to 
reporting that focused on dark networks. The reporting collection requirements of present 
security cooperation events are not suited to illuminate any networks that are not dark. 
This chapter will focus on how to correct and fill those gaps by presenting a simulated 
network to demonstrate the technique to collect data on security cooperation events to 
build a policy recommendation to allow for better analysis of security cooperation events. 
A. DILEMMA 
“Our vision is a globally networked force of Special Operations Forces, 
Interagency, Allies and Partners able to rapidly and persistently address 
regional contingencies and threats to stability.”124 
—Retired Admiral William H. McRaven 
 
The Philippines is host to an average of fifteen annual JCETs that have a price tag 
of $4-5 million per year.125 This does not include the regular non-SOF engagements 
conducted in addition to the JCETs. Analysis of the USSOF SC events reveals several 
apparent themes. A good assumption based on the amount and frequency of these 
engagements would be that enough information has been collected over the years to 
illustrate the network of host nation security forces.126 However, upon analyzing the 
reports submitted after each event, the information necessary to map these PSF networks 
was not present. This is due to the fact that the data to illuminate these dim networks is 
not part of the current reporting requirements. The SODARS, although detailed in many 
                                                 
124 William McRaven, Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, USN Commander, United 
States Special Operations Command Before the 113th Congress House Armed Services Committee (2013).  
125 Liebreich, “JCET Program Overview for PNP MG,” 2014.  
126 The total amounts of host nation personnel trained were 910 in 2014 and 1020 in 2013. Data 
obtained from JUSMAG Philippines reports sent to Naval Postgraduate school for research.  
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aspects, currently lacks the data fields necessary to illuminate friendly networks. The 
following example of a dim network using simulated data provides a comprehensive look 
of what information is essential and what different networks will look like once analyzed.   
B. SIMULATED CASE OVERVIEW 
At the onset of developing this thesis, it was identified that there was a shortfall in 
necessary data that would allow for the coding and mapping of the Philippine PSF 
network that is believed to exist. Despite SODARS reporting including specific 
information on the partnered units trained by USSOF, it did not include necessary 
relational data to begin to develop a network. Furthermore, despite the increasing access 
to open-source information, it was discovered that the data needed were not present 
online. It was necessary to create a simulated dim network that USSOF could encounter 
during SC events to justify this approach. To accomplish this, the network is simulated to 
ensure no analytical bias existed within the nodes or data used.     
C. GENERATING AND VISUALIZING THE NETWORK 
Because actors and the connections among them define networks, it is useful to 
begin the description of the simulated dim networks by examining these very simple 
properties. The actors presented in this simulated network are typical of those that can be 
found in a standard PSF network. Organizational connections are used to demonstrate 
how different dim networks can be developed through the mapping of these connections. 
As discussed in Chapter III, PSF networks that have not been mapped share 
characteristics of a dark network, in that the network is not known and could be 
considered somewhat clandestine. It is understood that a network exists because certain 
events may indicate this, such as a natural disaster or domestic crisis, where these forces 
can be seen cooperating with other agencies or organizations. Observing this places the 
network in a dim status within the spectrum of dark to light. This simulated network 
represents a dim network that progressed to the light end of the spectrum through the 
gathering of relational data between certain organizations and PSFs. Through the lens of 
SNA, each network is analyzed and centrality measures are calculated. The application of 
analysis is discussed and presented through the lens of an SC planner. 
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There are a host of different SNA tools available. One of the more useful benefits 
of SNA is its ability to visually represent data in network form. These visualizations are 
referred to as sociograms and show relational ties between nodes using a line connecting 
nodes that share a tie with each other. For this research, Organization Risk Analyzer 
(ORA) is used to simulate, visualize, and analyze the notional light network.127 In 
addition to ORA, the open-source statistical environment called R was used. We used 
RStudio128 software, a graphical user interface–based platform that provided us the 
ability to randomly generate values for X variables critical to the development of our 
hypothetical dim network. This statistical randomization allows for the mitigation of 
selection bias.   
PSF networks vary widely depending on their political connections, threats they 
face, and resources available to them; therefore, it was necessary to control for these 
variances and generalize the simulated network based on personal experiences, and an 
assumption that the network would replicate the average PSF network that USSOF will 
encounter. This process began by generating a scale-free randomized network within 
ORA. Scale-free129 was chosen because it more accurately represents existing networks. 
PSF networks typically consist of numerous well-connected units and some that are not 
connected to any entity outside their organic unit. This is typical of many former Soviet 
Bloc countries such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.   
This simulated network was generated with 20 nodes. The first 10 nodes were 
labeled as GPF130 1–10 and SOF 11–20. This network is labeled as the MIL_MIL 
                                                 
127 ORA is defined as “a network analysis tool that detects risks or vulnerabilities of an organization’s 
design structure. The design structure of an organization is the relationship among its personnel, 
knowledge, resources, and task entities. These entities and relationships are represented by a collection of 
networks called the Meta-Matrix. ORA analyzes the Meta-Matrix using measures, and reads and writes 
network data in multiple formats to make it interoperable with existing network analysis software.” 
Kathleen M. Carley and Jeff Reminga, “ORA: Organization Risk Analyzer,” Carnegie Mellon University, 
Center for Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems, Pittsburgh, PA, 2004, 1.   
128 For more information on RStudio please visit https://www.rstudio.com/products/rstudio/. For more 
information on R, please visit https://www.r-project.org/. 
129 For more detailed information on scale-free networks, see the Barabasi and Bonabeau article, 
“Scale-Free Networks,” Scientific American, 2003. 
130 GPF stands for general-purpose force, also known as conventional or regular forces. 
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Network. This network consists of an equal distribution of a host nation’s GPF and SOF 
for the purposes of negating any precondition of numerical advantage.   
Figure 15.   ORA MIL_MIL network (simulated) 
 
 
The use of the scale-free function produced a network with a core group of 
connected nodes and eight isolates (Figure 15). Though not the most illuminating, the 
calculation of certain centrality measures can be done to determine the basic level of 
influence a unit might have based on their connections to other military units. Figure 16 
shows the network with node sizes based on their total degree of centrality. 
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Figure 16.   ORA MIL_MIL network nodes sized by total degree of centrality 
 
 
This initial analysis, though not conclusive, does provide an SC planner with a 
simulated assessment of which units within this network are the most connected. By 
ranking the connections, a planner could then infer a unit with the most connections 
could also have the most influence in a friendly light network that could be in turn 
influenced through continued engagement.   
The next step was to generate additional dim networks that are assumed to exist in 
the PSF network. This step begins with the assumption that connections and cooperation 
exist between the PSF and local government units (LGU).131 For the purposes of 
simplicity, 10 LGUs were incorporated into the already established MIL_MIL network. 
                                                 
131 LGU refers to governmental entities below the national level government, such as provinces, 
districts, and so on. This could range from local law enforcement, local enterprises, correctional facilities, 
to public works, etc.   
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Using RStudio, a random number generator was created to provide the number of ties 
each military unit would have. Once the number was generated, a randomly generated set 
of numbers was created based on the previous random number. This process provides a 
truly random set of relational ties for each node.   





The first code would provide a single number; for example, 4. The number 4 
would then be inserted into the second code and that code would provide 4 random 
numbers between 1 and 10.132 Each number would correspond to an LGU (1–10). Within 
the editor function in ORA, all the ties for the MIL_LGU network were randomized in 
this fashion. This network is depicted in Figure 17.   
  
                                                 
132 The R code used can be found in the Appendix. 
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Figure 17.  MIL_LGU network 
 
 
The next step was to create an NGO network. The widespread involvement of 
NGOs in all aspects of global interaction cannot be ignored. As described in the earlier 
case study, NGOs can have significant strategic effects on the military operating 
environment. Therefore, recording and understanding the ties PSFs have with NGOs is 
important for the overall analysis of these networks and determination of PSFs’ influence 
within the environment. The previous process for LGUs was replicated, to develop the 
MIL_NGO network consisting of ten NGO nodes.  
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Figure 18.   ORA simulated MIL_NGO network 
 
 
Each separate network can provide certain insights in the potential level of 
influence that the PSF units maintains; however, it is not until each network is compiled 
into one cohesive network that we can assume some level of accuracy on the true level of 
influence based on their overall connectedness.   
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Once all the simulated networks have been created and compiled into one 
network, then ORA can be used to analyze the network. This chapter will apply and focus 
on four centrality measures, although there are many more that can be analyzed and 
provide different insights into understanding the network. The measures that we have 
selected all have specific utility in determining the connectedness of each node. These 
measures can provide an SC planner with the initial analysis to determine which units 
may have the most influence through their ties and thus begin to craft an engagement 
strategy that meets the commander’s intent, expected outcomes, and desired end state. 
Though each measure is not specific to dim networks, their utility as the vehicle that can 
 84 
advance a dim network to a light network is central to their selection. Centrality is a 
determinant factor of the level of influence a network has. Influence, along with 
capability and capacity, should be regarded as important characteristics of PSF units.    
D. ANALYZING THE NETWORK  
ORA allows the user to process specific reports that provide a listing of all 
measurable data. We employed this capability to produce a report that displayed the 
node-level measures of our combined network. We narrowed the results to the top ten 
nodes in each measure. Table 5 provides the top ten nodes ranked by their total degree 
centrality scores. Total degree centrality is a normalized sum of the nodes ties.133 Nodes 
that have a higher score indicate that they have a higher degree of connectivity in the 
network, or they essentially have the most connections. It is assumed that nodes that have 
a higher score have more access within the network or access to the information within 
the network. This is very beneficial to the idea of shaping the operational environment 
and maximizing SC efforts across all security entities in a particular region. Identifying a 
PSF unit that is well-connected allows a planner or commander to prioritize manpower 
and resources toward SC engagements with that unit. Even if the unit is well-connected 
but not necessarily leveraging any influence within the network, U.S. forces could 
identify this and begin to manipulate this situation to benefit the host nation and 
American national interests. In this particular instance, an SC planner could cross-
reference the units in the network with historical reporting on the units that U.S. forces 
have persistently engaged. In doing so, the planner can assist in providing the commander 
with a better picture of where each PSF ranks within the network. Depending on the lines 
of effort for that command, the commander and staff can adjust their engagement strategy 
to capitalize on the connectedness of the PSF in their region.   
 This idea can be carried through each of the centrality measures presented or 
applied to the totality of analysis of all four combined. This will provide a more complex 
understanding of the network as well as each specific node in the network. Table 5 
identifies the top nine scores in betweenness centrality. The nodes that rank the highest 
                                                 
133 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 399. 
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have the shortest path across all node pairs for connectivity. Nodes that rank high in 
betweenness centrality have a greater potential to broker connections between other 
groups because of their position along the shortest path of connectivity. This brokering 
capability could be used to influence one group to apply influence on another. As 
mentioned previously, this analysis can provide SC planners with insight that could prove 
to be extremely valuable and directly impact the effectiveness of the engagement strategy 
in a particular region. 








Table 7 lists the top ten nodes for closeness. Closeness is most easily described as 
how many connections it takes for a node to have a connection with all other nodes. This 
distance can be described as steps. The lower the average number of steps a node is from 
all others in the network can indicate its respective position in the network as well as an 
increased ability to influence the network in certain situations.   
Table 8 lists the top ten nodes for Eigenvector centrality. This measurement 
determines a nodes weighted centrality based on the magnitude of its ties centrality. This 
measurement focuses on the power of cliques and the importance of who the perceived 
leader of that clique is. In certain instances, the security forces of a country are separated 
by a delineation of responsibility such as internal or external security, maritime security, 
or counterterrorism. Understanding this dynamic would greatly increase the SC planner’s 
insight into the unwritten hierarchy of a particular country’s security apparatus. 
Concentrating efforts to either cultivate this leadership or reduce or reassign its influence 
                                                 
134  This table lists only the top nine because of all the other nodes being tied for tenth with a score of 
0.000. 
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for U.S. interests via USSOF objectives can be determined through the use of this 
centrality measure.    
Across the four measures, certain nodes maintain high rankings. SOF_18, 
SOF_17, SOF_14 are consistently in the top five in three of the four measures. GPF_1 
and GPF_2 are in the top five in two of the four measures. Many of these nodes are 
within a degree of each other or are tied with the same score. Though not conclusive, this 
basic analysis of the network shows that even with minimal detail the application and 
utility in applying SNA to exiting PSF networks can provide an SC planner with evidence 
to make informed recommendations. These recommendations could range from 
continuing to maintain the current strategy, identify new units to engage to improve or 
expand their influence in the network or reduce the influence of a unit through the 
reduction of U.S. influence and support. 








For this particular instance, it appears that the SOF units are the most connected. 
This could be due to U.S. involvement that, when substantiated, could indicate a certain 
measure of progress or success. The inclusion of the GPF forces in the top five could 
identify a shortfall in engagement for the TSOC because the typical force of choice to 
engage with is SOF. Identifying units outside of the traditional forces that the TSOC 
engages with could allow the planners to expand their level of influence to these units 
that appear to have a high level of centrality in the overall security network. 
Through the use of SNA software, such as ORA, a planner can incorporate 
additional variables or attributes as they become available or as a part of a concerted 
collection effort, whether overt or covert. The incorporation of these variables and 
attributes will continue to illuminate these dim networks, rendering them more and more 
complete. As these networks are mapped and the understanding of the networks 
advances, SC planners will have the tools necessary to optimize peacetime engagement 
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efforts. This begins with the selection of the most appropriate unit based on the 
commander’s lines of effort and intent. 
E. FINAL THOUGHTS 
The DOD will need to reexamine and possibly update its engagement strategy to 
determine if it is structured in a manner to have optimal results forging necessary and 
long-lasting SC networks. SNA can be used to develop a model to assist the commander 
and staff in developing an engagement strategy by determining which forces will provide 
the best opportunity for advancing both national and regional security efforts. Networks 
can be examined based on the amount and type of influential ties either created and/or 
maintained by the PSF to determine an optimum level of influence and network 
performance. However, in certain countries, PSF selection is centered on national politics 
over anything else. This type of selection cannot be avoided in these situations but, in the 
absence of such political constraints, a robust and influential network is an ideal attribute 
for a PSF unit to have.  
The engagement plan has multiple options available when approaching a PSF 
with inadequate or a less than optimum influential network. The first is to continue to 
engage with the unit but prioritize an expansion and/or adjustment in network 
connections and capability as part of the engagement strategy. This can include an 
increase in ties to other organizations or possibly decreasing connections based on the 
type and need for specific ties to exist. This can be accomplished by conducting joint 
training or joint operations during the engagement. Because networks are constantly 
changing, there is no specific methodology prescribed here. General methods to 
accomplish this option have been identified in earlier sections of this thesis, but 
information that maps light networks must be continuously sought and recorded. The 
next best option is to partner with the PSF with the most optimal network available that 
can be leveraged in a time of crisis. This option is preferred if there is limited episodic 
engagements planned and/or restricted training opportunities available. Nonetheless, 
before these options are available, the information that indicates how these units compare 
with one another again has to become a priority within existing reporting.    
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This approach is not limited to information collected from the field. SNA can be 
conducted on previous historical terrorist incidents in specific countries to illustrate the 
evolution of the friendly units involved and their connectivity to other units and agencies 
over a specific timeline. The focus of this analysis will not be on the dark networks or 
terrorist organizations that caused the event, but on the host nation security forces that 
responded. This will give an indication of how USSOF engagements have shaped the 
operational environment and if USSOF are currently partnered with the ideal security 
force in that country. Similar approaches can be used in other countries independent of 
their exposure to USSOF engagements. This will allow for planners to analyze how host 
nation organizations are used in a time of crisis and how security forces are connected to 




“But it is an unfortunate fact that we can secure peace only by 
preparing for war.”135 
—President John F. Kennedy 
 
Social network theorists have used the term “light network,” which has a 
generally understood meaning of cooperative networks not attempting to conceal 
themselves.136 Light networks are vital for USSOF to understand in order to build 
effective networks throughout the world. Barabàsi and Bonabeau, in Scale-Free 
Networks, express the notion that networks are everywhere and “Societies, too, are 
networks of people linked by friendships, familial relationships and professional ties.”137 
One way to accomplish an enhanced level of understanding of the environment is through 
analysis of the people who live and operate there.  
A. VALIDITY FOR IMPLEMENTATION 
Today’s unknown groups throughout the world can cause the problems and 
challenges that have plague the United States in the twenty-first century. The key to 
solving these unknowns is to have existing mechanisms capable of responding to threats. 
One focus area is to know, understand, and influence the networks in strategic areas 
around the world. The study of light networks within host nation militaries across the 
world has largely been ignored; yet, these networks can be instrumental by being used in 
ways to avoid large-scale U.S. military intervention. From a networking perspective, 
theater security cooperation events can be improved to better contribute to long-term U.S. 
government objectives using SNA. One method to ensure the pendulum shifts in this 
direction is to invest in SNA tools and resources and apply them to all engagement 
strategies within SC.  
                                                 
135 Kennedy. “Speech of Senator John F. Kennedy, Civic Auditorium, Seattle, WA” September 6, 
1960. 
136 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 6.  
137 Barabási and Bonabeau, Scale-Free Networks, 62.  
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Understanding dim and light networks can have tremendous advantages for both 
the U.S. and the host nation involved. Information about light networks will allow the 
U.S. to observe how partner forces are connected domestically and regionally. This will 
allow USSOF units to have a better sense of how their engagement can realistically shape 
the operational environment, thus advancing the TSCP. Additionally, this understanding 
will allow the host nation to graphically represent the extent of its security forces’ 
influence from a network perspective.  
This research has developed a three-phase approach to integrate SNA into SC. 
This is a long-term initiative and this research is attempting to initiate the conversations 
with the policy makers in order to uncover advantages that were not previously known 
about. The first phase is investment. This phase starts with the GCC implementing 
standard operating procedures to incorporate this approach into current peacetime 
engagements. The next phase is development. During phase 2, select cases will be used to 
advance this approach across the different combatant commands. Within these cases, 
historical examples can be used to indicate the connections units had before USSOF 
engagements and the connections they presently have. If a unit does not fit in with what 
the TSOC commander wants in that region, a new unit can be selected that is more suited 
to accomplish long-term strategic interests in the area. The following phases (investment 
and development) were developed along with this research as a way to institutionalize 
this approach. 
1. Execution 
a. Phase 1 Investment 
This phase starts with Combatant Command agreeing with this approach and each 
command enforcing the type of data collection necessary to illuminate the dim networks 
across the region.  
  Essential tasks during this phase:  
1. Standardization across current security cooperation reporting 
requirements that highlight a dim network SNA focus.   
2. SNA implementation at tactical, operational, and strategic levels.  
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3. This must become a joint venture with designed cross-service SNA 
education.  
b. Phase 2 Development 
This phase starts with the formulation of a strategy to implement in key states. 
Data and analysis must be continuously updated to show any differences and/or evolution 
of the light networks overtime. This phase must demonstrate the utility for this approach 
to the U.S. Country Team and host nation. By using SNA to move the spectrum of dim 
networks toward light networks, the optimal partner force can be selected that bests meets 
the strategic goals of the United States.  
2. Study Purpose 
This thesis proposes ways to use SNA to select the ideal partner force in 
noncombat environments. Updated reporting requirements and engagement strategies 
focused toward understanding complex strategic environments is necessary. Although 
this advancement cannot occur overnight, this research is aimed at slowly moving the 
methodology forward to gain interests across the DOD. If the shift toward prioritizing the 
illumination of these types of networks does not occur, it will be difficult to learn whether 
the units being engaged have the political connectivity and resources necessary to be 
called on by the national government to successfully interdict a crisis. Consequently, this 
could demand increases in the mobilization of U.S. forces, which will soon be a 
significant challenge for the U.S. administration.  
B. FURTHER RESEARCH 
Current operations in the Middle East present ideal conditions to test this method 
of analysis further with U.S.-partnered forces in the region. Syria has been the location of 
failed attempts to build a partner force that have similar objectives of the United States 
and are capable of defeating adversaries. SNA can be a means to visualize how the 
existing forces operating within this region are actually situated around the chaos in the 
area as opposed to creating a capable force from little to nothing. This approach can be 
used to illustrate relational structures within current military organizations, identify 
fracture points toward the Syrian Regime, or identify allegiance toward ISIS. However, 
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was this type of information collected during previous military engagements conducted in 
the region? In addition, was the interpretation of PSF networks in this area a top priority 
for commanders during these engagements? If not, and the data to illuminate the security 
forces in this area are not available, the best time to start is the present. This will give the 
United States and a coalition against current threats a means to understand how local 
moderate forces are positioned and what ties need to be eliminated and/or strengthen to 
increase chances of launching successful future operations.  
Additional research is needed to determine what, if any, correlation exists 
between the capabilities of a unit and the amount of external network connections. In 
other words, once a unit is highly specialized and reaches a certain level of proficiency, is 
there a point where external ties become less relevant or the relational ties change as the 
political environment changes? This would be important to consider in the decision-
making process concerning network manipulation and future engagement strategy. 
Although the available data to understand these dim networks are limited, this research 
employs the methods used to study dark and light networks to improve future efforts to 
lighten the formerly dim networks. This illumination will help objectively determine the 
type of SC event to execute as well as the most optimal partner to engage with.   
C. FINAL THOUGHTS 
The short-term success from the kill-and-capture missions executed during the 
course of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, including the famous raid on Osama bin 
Laden, has overshadowed any other long-term strategy from materializing. A long-term 
strategy will require a long-term investment that favors accurate data collection, data 
structuring, and data analysis to be successful. New forms of warfare carried out against 
the United States and its allies will require new strategies. New groups are emerging that 
challenge the ability of the state to govern while simultaneously creating opportunities to 
benefit financially from the warfare and the chaos they inflict. These criminal and 
terrorist groups are becoming more adept at evolving in response to government actions 
against them. This increases the incentives from a cost-based analysis standpoint for the 
rise of dark networks conducting illegal activities. To defeat an organization that has 
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developed advanced network characteristics will require more information and analysis 
than current operations and reporting requirements command. The new strategies must 
include the ability to leverage the light networks to its full capacity against the dark 
networks. Understanding the full depth of our PSF networks, how U.S. forces can best 
influence those networks, and then leveraging them in a time of crisis may be the first 
step in developing these new strategies.   
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APPENDIX 
The R Code listed here will allow for the replication of the random number 
generators used for the simulated network in Chapter V. 
##Random selection of NGO ties 
RSNGOT <- sample (1:10, 1) 
RSNGOT 
The number generated with the previous code is inserted into the following code 
indicated by the #. 
##Random selection of which NGO(s) the MIL is tied to 
NMT <- sample (1:10, #, replace=F) 
NMT 
Each number corresponds to a different NGO (1–10). 
##Random selection of LGU ties 
RSLGUT <- sample (1:10, 1) 
RSLGUT 
The number generated with the previous code is inserted into the following code 
indicated by the #. 
##Random selection of which LGU(s) the MIL is tied to 
LMT <- sample (1:10, #, replace=F) 
LMT 
Each number corresponds to a different LGU (1–10). 
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